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INTRODUCTION 
It has now been four decades since the Supreme Court stepped 
into the political thicket with its groundbreaking series of reappor­
tionment cases.1 Those cases rather quickly brought about radical 
changes in the structure of our national, state, and local governments 
* Associate Professor, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A. 1989, M.A. 1991, Univer­
sity of Kansas; J.D. 1995, Stanford. - Ed. I am most grateful to Stephen Ellis for our many 
conversations on the subject of interpersonal utility comparisons, and to Heather Gerken, 
Joanna Grossman, Eric Freedman, Rick Hasen, Sam Issacharoff, Eric Lane, William Rose, 
and Peter Spiro for their helpful suggestions. Thanks as well to Katherine Gavett, Kristy 
DeAngelo, and Sarika Kapoor for their valuable research assistance. 
1. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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and, in so doing, reshaped the political landscape of the country in 
many, mostly beneficial, ways. The reapportionment cases also sig­
naled the beginning of a revolution in the way we view the rights asso­
ciated with meaningful participation in a democratic society, a revolu­
tion that continues to this day. We now enjoy a right to vote that is 
much more comprehensive - both in terms of who has the right to 
exercise the franchise and what that right entails - than at any other 
time in our history. 
Despite this record of success, one of the most important and least 
controversial aspects of the right to vote - the one person, one vote 
principle - has never been adequately theorized. Academics, politi­
cians, and the general public have, instead, taken it as an article of 
democratic faith. We are utterly confident that the one person, one 
vote principle rests on firm democratic foundations, that it is, in some 
sense, objective, and that it is a judicially manageable way of parsing 
out political power. The thesis of this Article is that this confidence is 
wholly misplaced. 
The right to vote now embodies three conceptually distinct types 
of rights.2 First, it includes the right to cast a vote.3 This right of access 
to the polls is, quite obviously, a necessary component of any concep­
tion of the right to vote, and represents the right at its most fundamen­
tal level. But the ability to register and vote, taken alone, does not 
secure meaningful political participation because district lines may be 
drawn in ways that effectively dilute the power of that vote. Such vote 
dilution comes in two forms, quantitative and qualitative, and the 
rights associated with casting an undiluted vote are the second and 
third types of voting rights.4 Quantitative vote dilution occurs when 
votes receive unequal weight, and thus the power of some votes is nu-
2. I borrow this basic taxonomy from Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The 
Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 173, 176 (1989). This, of course, is not the only way to categorize the many facets of 
political participation and the right to vote. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE 
MAJORITY 7-9 (1994) (categorizing the three generations of attempts to curb tyrannical 
majorities as involving (1) access to the ballot, (2) qualitative vote dilution, and (3) the po­
licing of legislative voting rules). Karlan's taxonomy does, however, capture most of the es­
sential elements of the right, and follows the basic structure of the law. 
3. Claims asserting infringement on the right to cast a vote are typically brought under 
the Constitution. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding 
that a poll tax prerequisite to voting in a state election violated the Equal Protection 
Clause). The Republican Form of Government Clause in the original Constitution implicitly 
protects the right to vote, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1, while constitutional amendments 
provide more explicit protections to vote free from discrimination on the basis of race, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XV, § 1; on the basis of sex, U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1; by reason of poll 
taxes in federal elections, U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1; or on account of age for citizens 
who are eighteen years of age or older, U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
4. For a short summary of these two types of vote dilution rights, see Grant M. Hayden, 
The Limits of Social Choice Theory: A Defense of the Voting Rights Act, 74 TUL. L. REV. 87, 
91-98 (1999). 
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merically diluted.5 Qualitative dilution, on the other hand, occurs 
when a voter has less opportunity to elect a representative of her 
choice, most often as a result of gerrymandered district lines, despite 
the fact that her vote is weighted equally with all other votes cast.6 
Of these three types of rights, the right to a quantitatively undi­
luted vote is the least controversial. A vote is numerically diluted 
whenever districts are drawn in ways that deviate from a standard dis­
trict size. Take, for example, a three-member governing body repre­
senting three single-member districts in a county of 30,000 people. If 
district lines are drawn such that the first district has a population of 
5,000, the second 5,000, and the third 20,000, then voters in the third 
district have an obvious disadvantage in voting power as a result of the 
unequal district sizes. The norm used to measure the extent of their 
dilution is the equiproportional standard, captured by the appealing 
phrase "one person, one vote." 
The one person, one vote principle was at the heart of the early re­
apportionment cases and has since become the sine qua non of democ­
racy.7 One of the primary reasons for its success is that it appears to be 
an objective or neutral way of parsing out political power. That is, un­
like the other two types of voting rights - which involve the norma­
tively loaded issues of who receives the right to vote and which groups 
deserve the right to a qualitatively undiluted vote - the quantitative 
cases can be resolved by mere reference to what is viewed as an ele­
mental component of democracy. For that reason, the one person, one 
vote standard enjoys tremendous popular support, and legal chal­
lenges to districts that deviate from it are both temporally and doctri­
nally privileged. 
The main thrust of this Article is that this accepted way of viewing 
quantitative vote dilution is misguided. A close examination of recent 
work in analytic philosophy and social economics makes clear that a 
decision to apply the one person, one vote standard is no more neutral 
or objective than decisions made with respect to the other two types of 
voting rights. In addition, removing the aura of objectivity from the 
standard helps reveal the connection between the three different types 
of voting rights that we now recognize. This, in tum, may allow us to 
restructure the law in a way that reflects the fundamental nature of the 
underlying rights. 
5. Claims asserting quantitative vote dilution are actionable under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Constitution. Baker, 369 U.S. at 237. 
6. Claims asserting qualitative vote dilution, while once litigated primarily under the 
Equal Protection Clause, see, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), are now typically 
pursued under the more relaxed standards of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Amend­
ments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 
(2000)). See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
7. For a survey of both academic and societal support for the standard, see infra notes 
52-65 and accompanying text. 
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I will develop my argument in three stages. Part I of the Article in­
volves an account of some of the basic concepts involved in quantita­
tive vote dilution. It begins with a brief historical survey of the legal 
status of population and voting, followed by a discussion of the con­
temporary appeal of the one person, one vote standard. I conclude this 
Part with a review of some of the arguments advanced for and against 
the standard, concluding that most arguments neither justify nor un­
dermine the standard, and certainly do little to link it to the other 
types of voting rights. 
Part II explores what I think is the key to understanding the claim 
of neutrality for the one person, one vote standard: the enduring 
problem of making interpersonal comparisons of utility. Utility, for 
our purposes, is best defined in terms of preference satisfaction, and 
thus in order to figure out the social utility of a particular state of af­
fairs, we must be able to compare (and, ultimately, sum up) each indi­
vidual's level of satisfaction. If, for example, I have a box of cookies 
and a box of crackers to distribute to my two children at the start of a 
long drive, I would want to know the relative strength of each child's 
preferences with respect to those treats in order to choose the distribu­
tion of cookies and crackers with the largest aggregate utility (or low­
est decibel level). 
Other, seemingly more important policy and distribution issues 
also require this sort of assessment of people's preferences. Such an 
assessment is also built into our acceptance of the one person, one 
vote standard, which, after all, instructs us how to weigh voter prefer­
ences in our political system. Thus, in this second Part, I will work 
through various attempts made by positivist philosophers and econo­
mists to compare the strength of individual preferences. As it turns out 
(much to the chagrin of those theorists), comparing the strength of the 
preferences of two or more people can never be done in a value-free, 
"objective" way. 
Finally, Part III argues that the value-laden process of making in­
terpersonal utility comparisons means that attempts to weight votes -
which, after all, are revealed preferences - are similarly tainted. That 
is, any quantitative vote dilution standard, including one person, one 
vote, necessarily involves normative judgments. This results in the 
somewhat counterintuitive conclusion that the avoidance, not accep­
tance, of interpersonal utility comparisons may be what drives us to 
the equiproportional standard. When faced with the difficulties in as­
sessing the strength of voter preferences with respect to most matters, 
we, in effect, have thrown up our hands and opted to assign them all 
equal weights. I also explain how the concept of interpersonal utility 
comparisons informs our view of deviations from the standard, and 
how it ties the three aspects of voting rights into a more unified whole. 
I conclude this Part, and the Article, with some preliminary sugges­
tions for changes in voting rights law. 
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I. QUANTITATIVE VOTE DILUTION AND ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE 
A. The Legal Status of Population and Voting 
Like the history of the franchise generally,8 the relationship be­
tween population and voting did not involve smooth and inexorable 
progress toward a particular goal (with the franchise, universal suf­
frage; with populations and voting, equally weighted voting). Nor did 
it involve a sudden moment of enlightenment in which the Court 
swept aside centuries of dimwitted political thinking and constitution­
alized the equiproportional standard. Instead, the notion that people 
exercising equally weighted votes should elect representative bodies 
had been central to our notion of government from the country's in­
ception.9 Then, over the first half of the twentieth century, the com­
mon practice of placing voters in equally sized districts fell by the way­
side as a result of restrictive state-constitution provisions and state 
legislators' unwillingness to relinquish power in the face of substantial 
demographic change.10 The constitutionally groundbreaking reappor­
tionment cases of the 1960s, Baker v. Carr,11 Reynolds v. Sims,12 and 
Wesberry v. Sanders,13 were less a revolution than a rebirth - albeit 
one with a vengeance - of a practice long part of American political 
institutions. 
8. For a recent discussion of the expansions and contractions of the right to vote, and 
their social, economic, and political causes, see ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO 
VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STA TES (2000). See also 
MARCHETTE G. CHUTE, THE FIRST LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN 
AMERICA, 1619-1850 (1969); BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL, MINORITY REPRESENTATION 
AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY (1992); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF 
SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE­
PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974); STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS 
IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969 (1976); CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM 
PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860 (1960); QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE 
IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman 
eds., 1994). 
9. See GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTA­
TION, POLITICAL POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT 16-22 (1966) [hereinafter BAKER, 
REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION] ; ROBERT B. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW 
AND POLmcs OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 16-29 (1965); Gordon E. Baker, One Person, 
One Vote: "Fair and Effective Representation"?, in REPRESENTATION AND MISRE­
PRESENTATION: LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 71, 72-
74 (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 1968) [hereinafter Baker, One Person, One Vote]; see also 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-18 (1964) (discussing the historical foundation of the 
standard). 
10. See BAKER, REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 24-31; MCKAY, 
supra note 9, at 49-52. 
11. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
12. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
13. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
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While the Declaration of Independence proclaimed it "self­
evident" that "all Men are created equal,"14 there was no language to 
that effect in the original Constitution. Nonetheless, there are many 
signs that proportional representation, if not the norm, was at least a 
benchmark for democracy at the national level in the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. For example, there is evidence that the 
Framers intended members of the House of Representatives - the 
only popularly elected federal office at the time15 - to be elected by 
people with equally weighted votes.16 The sentiment could also be 
found in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which, when providing for 
future governments of the Northwest Territory, said that its inhabi­
tants "shall always be entitled to the benefits . . .  of a proportionate 
representation of the people in the legislature."17 Thus, there is some 
indication that population-based districting was an accepted practice 
on the federal level at the time the country was founded. 
The situation was similar at the state level.18 Six of the original thir­
teen states based representation in both houses of their state legisla­
tures on population.19 And equality in representation made great gains 
during the period in which states were adopting their first constitu­
tions. 20 Indeed, of the remaining thirty-seven states, all but seven 
originally provided for population-based representation in both 
14. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
15. The president is chosen by members of the Electoral College, U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 1, cl. 3, and, under the original Constitution, senators were chosen by the state legislatures, 
U.S. CONST. art I,§ 3, cl. 1 (amended 1913). The Seventeenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, 
provides for the direct election of senators. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
16. See ANDREW HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING: THE ISSUE OF EQUAL 
REPRESENTATION 6-14 (rev. ed. 1964). The evidence comes from a wide range of sources, 
including the Constitution, the Philadelphia Convention, the Federalist Papers, and the state 
ratifying conventions. Id.; see also Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-18 (explaining that the historical 
context of the constitutional requirement that representatives be chosen "by the People of 
the several States" demands use of the equiproportional standard). But see id. at 30-39 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the historical record does not support the constitution­
alization of the equiproportional standard). 
17. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States north-west 
of the river Ohio, art. II (1787), 1 Stat. 50-2 (1789); see Baker, One Person, One Vote, supra 
note 9, at 72. 
18. For an extensive discussion of the law governing apportionment and redistricting in 
each of the fifty states, see McKAY, supra note 9, at app. 
19. See BAKER, REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 20; Baker, One 
Person, One Vote, supra note 9, at 72-73; see also MCKAY, supra note 9, at 17-19. But see 
ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW 
AND POLITICS 60-64 (1968) [hereinafter DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION] ; Robert 
G. Dixon, Jr., Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional Struggle 
for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. REV. 209, 239-42 (1964). These contrasting views stem 
from conflicting interpretations of what it meant for a state constitution to call for appor­
tionments based predominantly on population. For a discussion of the issue, see Baker, One 
Person, One Vote, supra note 9, at 73. 
20. See McKAY, supra note 9, at 16-19. 
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houses.21 Thus, whatever one says about the rise of the concept of 
population-based apportionment in the 1960s and 1970s, it was only 
new to those with short historical memories. 
The beginning of the shift away from population-based appor­
tionment came in the five-year period after the Civil War.22 Many of 
the southern states reentered the Union with new constitutions that 
incorporated factors other than population into their districting 
schemes.23 The South Carolina Senate, for example, included one 
senator from each county, regardless of population.24 The real shift, 
though, occurred in the first half of the twentieth century, as new pat­
terns of migration and immigration transformed the demographic 
landscape of America. 
The waves of Europeans and rural blacks who migrated to urban 
areas meant that, by 1920, white, Protestant, rural Americans had be­
come a minority.25 They were, nevertheless, a minority with control 
over state legislatures and, hence, command over the reapportionment 
process for congressional and state legislative districts. In the face of 
the dramatic population shifts from the country to the city, the rural 
minority did what it could to preserve its own power, which, in short, 
meant that it did absolutely nothing - it refused to redraw district 
lines in light of the population changes.26 
The effect of the refusal to redistrict was to numerically concen­
trate the voting power of those in the relatively small (and shrinking) 
rural districts, and, correspondingly, to dilute the power of those in the 
large (and growing) urban districts. Over time, the disparities grew 
quite large. In Vermont, for example, the most populous district had 
987 times more people than the least populous (and, of course, both 
districts sent one representative to the state legislature ).27 While 
Vermont was an outlier, population differentials of ten or twenty to 
one were quite common by the middle of the century.28 
21. See id. at 24-25. From 1790 to 1889, no state was admitted with an original constitu­
tion that did not provide for representation based principally on population. Id. 
22. See William J.D. Boyd, Reapportionment: Problems, Prospects, and Probabilities, in 
REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION, supra note 9, at 115, 115. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. See C. Herman Pritchett, Representation and the Rule of Equality, in 
REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION, supra note 9, at 1, 3. 
26. As H.L. Mencken put it, "The yokels hang on because old apportionments give 
them unfair advantages." J. Anthony Lukas, Barnyard Government in Maryland, in 
REAPPORTIONMENT 55 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1964); see also BAKER, REAPPORTIONMENT 
REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 24-31; MCKAY, supra note 9, at 49-53. 
27. See PAUL T. DAVID & RALPH EISENBERG, DEVALUATION OF THE URBAN & 
SUBURBAN VOTE 3 (1961). 
28. The districts at issue in Baker v. Carr, for example, gave rise to differences in voting 
power of twenty to one, see 369 U.S. 186, 245 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring), and those in 
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A political solution to this numerical bottleneck was not forth­
coming. State legislators from the more sparsely populated rural dis­
tricts had no interest in redistricting themselves out of office (or out of 
power). And, for many years, the Supreme Court was disinclined to 
intervene in what it considered to be a nonjusticiable political ques­
tion. But while Colegrove v. Green, the landmark case on that issue, 
upheld the judiciary's hands-off approach,29 it also signaled the 
changes to come, for three members of the Court asserted for the first 
time that the Equal Protection Clause required the election of repre­
sentatives from districts of roughly equal size.30 
The reapportionment cases of the early 1960s, of course, broke 
through the political logjam. The Court found in Baker v. Carr that 
the unequal districts resulting from the Tennessee legislature's refusal 
to reapportion in the face of large population shifts gave rise to a justi­
ciable claim under the Equal Protection Clause.31 And while the Court 
saw no immediate need to devise standards for judging numerical dilu­
tion claims (for the merits of the case were not before it),32 it soon 
provided some guidance. The very next year, the Court articulated the 
basic standard in Gray v. Sanders: "The conception of political equal­
ity from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg 
Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments 
can mean only one thing - one person, one vote."33 
While "one person, one vote" established an ideal - that of equi­
proportional voting power - the phrase did not demarcate the range 
of constitutionally permissible variation. The Court offered some re­
finements on the basic standard the following year in Wesberry v. 
Sanders34 and Reynolds v. Sims.35 In Wesberry, the Court held that "the 
command of Art. I, § 2, that Representatives be chosen 'by the People 
of the several States' means that as nearly as is practicable one man's 
Reynolds v. Sims up to forty-one to one, 377 U.S. 533, 545 (1964). See also BAKER, 
REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 82 tbl.11 (listing the range of variation 
for congressional districts in selected states); MCKAY, supra note 9, at 46-47 (listing the 
range of variation for state legislative districts). 
29. 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
30. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 569-72 (Black, J., dissenting). Justices Douglas and Murphy 
joined Justice Black's dissent both on the equal protection issue and in finding apportion­
ment issues to be justiciable. Id. at 572-74 (Black, J., dissenting). 
31. 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962). 
32. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 198. The lack of a standard stemmed from the political com­
promises necessary to achieve a majority on the justiciability issue. See RICHARD L. HASEN, 
THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO 
BUSH V. GORE 52 (2003). 
33. 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). 
34. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
35. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's."36 
And the Reynolds Court found that "seats in both houses of a bicam­
eral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis,"37 by 
which it meant that one's right to vote is unconstitutionally impaired 
when the weight of that vote "is in a substantial fashion diluted when 
compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State."38 
Thus, when it came to this "basic standard of equality among voters"39 
for congressional and state legislative elections, after Wesberry and 
Reynolds we had some language indicating the range of permissible 
variation, at a minimum giving us the idea that the Court may permit 
some deviation from the ideal. 
Over the next several decades, faced with districting plans lacking 
the dramatic population differences in earlier cases, the Court was 
forced to further refine its standard.40 It increasingly held congres­
sional districts to a strict standard that did not permit them any devia­
tion from the ideal size.41 The Court, however, effectively gave state 
36. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8 (emphasis added). While the Court later conceded that "it 
may not be possible to draw congressional districts with mathematical precision," id. at 18, 
that possibility became real with the advent of better census data and more powerful com­
puters, see Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of 
Political Fairness, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1643, 1654 (1993). 
37. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568. 
38. Id. (emphasis added). 
39. Id. at 561. 
40. Refinements of the standard included developing a standard method of calculating 
deviation from the equiproportional ideal. The Supreme Court developed a measure called 
the maximum population deviation, which is calculated for single-member districts using the 
following steps: First, calculate the ideal district size by dividing the apportionment base 
(usually population) by the number of districts. Then, add the percentage excess of the larg­
est district over the ideal district size to the percentage deficit of the smallest district under 
the ideal district size. That sum is the maximum population deviation. This method is most 
clearly shown in Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1975). 
If, for example, we are dividing a population of 30,000 among three legislative districts, 
our ideal district size is 10,000. If the largest and smallest districts actually have populations 
of 11,500 and 8,000, the maximum population deviation is 35% (15% deviation upward plus 
20% deviation downward). 
41. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 728 (1983) (rejecting a New Jersey dis­
tricting plan that involved a .6984% maximum deviation); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 
526, 528-30 (1969) (rejecting a Missouri districting plan that involved a 5.97% maximum de­
viation). While the Court has been clear that it allows slight deviations in certain circum­
stances, see Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 98 (1997); Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740; Connor v. 
Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 419-20 (1977); Chapman, 420 U.S. at 26, it rarely finds that such circum­
stances exist. 
The constitutional requirement that representatives be apportioned among the several 
states means that congressional districts do not cross state lines, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 
3, from which it follows that the Court's standard of "precise mathematical equality," 
Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530-31, only applies to districts within a single state. After the most 
recent round of redistricting, this, coupled with the one-representative-per-state minimum, 
means that while the congressional district in Wyoming has a population of 495,304, the one 
in Montana has a population of 905,316. See KAREN M. MILLS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT 1, 4 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2001pubs/c2kbr01-7.pdf. The average district size is 646,952. Id. at 1. 
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and local election districts a more flexible standard, allowing maxi­
mum deviations of up to 10% without justification42 and slightly 
greater deviations when suitably justified.43 But even these deviations 
were quite small compared to those in the decades before Baker, 
Reynolds, and Wesberry. Thus, the one person, one vote standard now 
reigns supreme over congressional, state, and local legislative district­
ing schemes,44 and enjoys the doctrinal privilege of being one of the 
few Equal Protection Clause violations actionable without a showing 
of discriminatory intent.45 
B. The Popular Appeal of "One Person, One Vote" 
In marked contrast to its reluctance to accept some of the Warren 
Court's other forays into civil rights, America has embraced the one 
person, one vote standard.46 The reasons for the standard's popular 
appeal are not mysterious. It stems in part from the standard's ability 
to capture an egalitarian sentiment in something approaching an 
aphorism.47 At the same time, it appears to reflect America's individu-
42. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983): 
" [M]inor deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative districts are insuffi­
cient to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth 
Amendment so as to require justification by the State." [The Court's] decisions have estab­
lished, as a general matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum population devia­
tion under 10% falls within the category of minor deviations. 
Id. (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973)); see also Connor, 431 U.S. at 
418; White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764 (1973); Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 751. 
43. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324-25 (upholding a Virginia state redistricting 
plan with a maximum deviation of 16.4% on the basis of the state's interest in preserving the 
integrity of political subdivision boundary lines), modified, 411 U.S. 922 (1973). 
44. There are some limited exemptions that apply to some governing bodies. See, e.g., 
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 733-35 (1973) (al­
lowing elections for the governing body of a water-storage district to weight votes according 
to the assessed valuation of each voter's land). For a fuller discussion of the exemption for 
"special-purpose districts," see infra text accompanying notes 185-203. 
45. See, e.g., Tucker v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 958 F.2d 1411, 1414-15 (7th 
Cir. 1992). 
46. See Issacharoff, supra note 36, at 1657 n.72 (stating that "the appeal of individual 
equality in the political process proved so strong that these decisions did not spark an outcry 
similar to that arising in response to the Court's forays into the civil rights and criminal jus­
tice areas"); Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 731, 741 (1998) [hereinafter Karlan, The Fire Next Time] (claiming that, 
unlike some of the Warren Court's other holdings, "one person, one vote has occasioned no 
backlash and seems wildly popular across the political spectrum"); Robert B. McKay, Reap­
portionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REV. 223, 224-25 (1968) (noting 
that the decisions were more easily implemented than those involving race relations, the 
First Amendment, and criminal justice). 
47. See Lani Guinier & Pamela S. Karlan, The Majoritarian Difficulty: One Person, One 
Vote, in REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE BRENNAN'S ENDURING INFLUENCE 207, 207 (E. 
Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997) ("Ask the average person on the street 
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alist ethic and its people's affection for the rights of everyday citizens. 
Finally, like a well-engineered slogan, it structures the issue of repre­
sentation in a way that makes opposition seem absurd: who could be 
against "one person, one vote"? 
This is not to say that the Supreme Court's early opinions in the 
area were met with universal acclaim. Those in state legislatures, at 
least initially, did not share the public's fondness for the standard. 
There were serious attempts to amend the Constitution and to restrict 
federal-court review of state reapportionment in a way that would re­
duce or eliminate the impact of the Supreme Court's reapportionment 
decisions.48 But even state legislatures soon began to accept the new 
standard,49 perhaps because application of the standard ushered in a 
new set of incumbents whose positions now depended, in part, on the 
maintenance of the newly drawn districts.50 By the early 1970s, as the 
Court was stepping into the morass of qualitative vote dilution, Justice 
Brennan could take note of the "truly extraordinary record of compli­
ance with the constitutional mandate" of one person, one vote.51 
Moreover, many in the academy now take the standard for granted 
as a starting point in their analysis of what they view as the more com­
plex issue of qualitative vote dilution.52 Those who are most critical of 
the Supreme Court's ventures into qualitative vote dilution often con­
trast the objective, easily managed one person, one vote standard with 
the subjective, normative process that infects judicial decisions in the 
qualitative cases.53 For them, the equiproportional standard is the way 
what democracy means and she is likely to reply 'majority rule.' Ask her what political 
equality means and she is likely to reply 'one person, one vote.' "). The phrase is, in a sense, 
the pithy, democratic answer to "might makes right." 
48. See BAKER, REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 12-13 (listing some 
of the political repercussions of the 1964 reapportionment decisions); Jerry B. Waters, Re­
apportionment: The Legislative Struggle, in REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION, 
supra note 9, at 141, 153-59 (detailing the response of both Congress and outside organiza­
tions to Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), from 1964 to 1966). The Republican Party 
actually endorsed the idea of a constitutional amendment on apportionment at its 1964 con­
vention. Waters, supra, at 154. 
49. See Guinier & Karlan, supra note 47, at 211 (noting that while in the early 1960s 
forty-eight of the fifty states had legislatures with district variances of more than 15%, by the 
early 1970s only fourteen states had such large variances). 
50. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 121 (1980). 
51. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 779 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
52. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a Conservative 
Mirror, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 359, 379-82 (2001). Early on, of course, it was a different 
story, as Baker generated quite a bit of opposition in the academy. See id. at 269 & 369-72 
nn.56-62 (listing articles by Alexander Bickel, Stanley Friedelbaum, Jerold Israel, Jo Desha 
Lucas, Robert McCloskey, Phil Neal, and Allan Sindler opposing the decision). It was not, 
however, without its early defenders. See id. at 368-69 n.52 (listing articles by Thomas 
Emerson, Charles Black, Robert McKay, Louis Pollak, and others defending the decision). 
53. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Still Lost in the Political Thicket (or Why I Don't Under­
stand the Concept of Vote Dilution), 50 VAND. L. REV. 327, 331-35 (1997) (contrasting the 
"procedural" conception of democracy that relies upon such principles as majority rule and 
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that courts have been able to avoid the real political thicket, which 
lies, it turns out, in the qualitative cases.s4 And while there have been 
some academic criticisms of the one person, one vote standard itself, 
most deal, at best, glancing blows.ss Some, for example, focus on the 
hopelessness of striving for perfect adherence to the standard in a 
world of imperfect demographic information;s6 others concentrate on 
the standard's role in providing vehicle lawsuits for virtually any chal­
lenge to a new districting plan.s7 Few challenge the equiproportional 
standard head on, except to say that there do not appear to be any 
positive substantive arguments in its favor.s8 Far more common, how­
ever, are unreflective acceptances of the standard, as when one com­
mentator, in a tribute to Justice Douglas, wrote that in the one person, 
one vote formulation, "one senses the rightness of that decision, as 
well as the common sense of this and the other apportionment deci­
sions - despite their alleged lack of analysis and fidelity to text."s9 
The popular appeal of the one person, one vote standard has, if 
anything, increased over the four decades since it became a constitu­
tional mandate. It continues to hold a position as the defining charac­
teristic of our democracy.60 Popular periodicals, for example, refer to 
the standard in glowing terms.61 In the 2000 presidential election con­
troversy, the importance of the principles of Reynolds v. Sims was one 
of the few things that both parties, and the Supreme Court, could 
agree upon.62 It has become so deeply entrenched in the popular 
one person, one vote with the "substantive" conception of democracy more closely allied 
with qualitative vote dilution claims). 
54. See id. at 331. 
55. For a more complete discussion, see infra Part I.C.2. 
56. See infra text accompanying notes 101-114. 
57. See, e.g., Karlan, The Fire Next Time, supra note 46, at 735. 
58. Some criticize the standard for its failure to achieve the goal of ensuring democratic 
fairness. See infra text accompanying notes 115-119. Others just see a lack of substantive ar­
guments in its favor. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 87 (1990) (criti­
cizing the redistricting decisions on the basis that the "Warren majority's new constitutional 
doctrine was supported by nothing"); ELY, supra note 50, at 121 (famously noting that while 
the one person, one vote standard "is certainly administratable[,] the more troublesome 
question is what else it has to recommend it"). 
59. Melvin I. Urofsky, William 0. Douglas as a Common Law Judge, 41 DUKE L.J. 133, 
154 (1992). 
60. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker's Promise, Equal Protection, and the Modern Re­
districting Revolution: A Plea for Rationality, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1353, 1355 n.7 (2002) (listing 
various modem paeans to the standard); Guinier & Karlan, supra note 47, at 207 (discussing 
generally the widespread acceptance of the standard). 
61. See, e.g., John Carey, Is There Any Help for the "Hanging Chad"?, Bus. WK., 
Nov. 27, 2000, at 54 ("One person, one vote. Each vote counts. That's the bedrock of 
democracy."). 
62. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) ("It must be remembered that 'the right of 
suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as 
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.' " (quoting Reynolds v. 
November 2003] The False Promise of One Person, One Vote 225 
imagination that merely questioning the standard can bring about 
public approbation. In the contentious confirmation battle over Judge 
Charles Pickering, Sr. to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, opponents 
condemned him for (among other things) merely being "troubled" by 
the legal principle of one person, one vote.63 Michael McConnell, an 
academic nominated and confirmed to the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, ran into similar controversy.64 Indeed, the standard is so 
widely accepted that Jon Elster recently defined democracy as "simple 
majority rule, based on the principle, 'One person one vote.' "65 
C. Justifications for the One Person, One Vote Standard 
1. Some Traditional Justifications for the Standard 
Although the equiproportional standard enjoys an exalted legal 
status and continuing popular appeal, the justifications for it are not 
altogether obvious. Historically, of course, the explanation for the 
move to the standard was that an entrenched political establishment, 
determined to hold onto its power in the face of demographic change, 
produced legislative districts of radically different sizes. This political 
logjam resulted in what Robert McKay called discrimination by both 
design and oversight.66 Either way, the judiciary (and others) recog­
nized that people in more populous, usually urban, districts were un­
derrepresented. Accordingly, such districts received less state and fed­
eral attention to their unique problems.67 The introduction of the 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964)); Brief for Petitioners at 40-41, Bush (No. 00-949) ("'The 
conception of political equality ... can mean only one thing - one person, one vote . .. .' -
'[t]he idea that every voter is equal to every other voter in his State, when he casts his ballot 
in favor of one of several competing candidates, underlies many of our decisions.' " (quoting 
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558 (internal citations omitted))); Brief of Respondent at 2, Bush (No. 
00-949) ("[T]his Court has long championed the fundamental right of all who are qualified to 
cast their votes 'and to have votes counted.'" (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554)). The 
tenuous connection between the issues in that case and the principles enunciated in 
Reynolds makes my point here even more solid. 
63. An Unworthy Judicial Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2002, § 4, at 12. Judge 
Pickering, in an extended discussion of the Supreme Court's quantitative vote dilution cases, 
had criticized the Court's application of the one person, one vote standard as being overly 
precise. See Fairly v. Forrest County, 814 F. Supp. 1327 (S.D. Miss. 1993). 
64. Judging Michael McConnell, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2002, § 4, at 12. This charge was 
made because McConnell merely questioned the choice to base the one person, one vote 
decisions on the Equal Protection Clause as opposed to the guarantee of a republican form 
of government. See Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and 
Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103 (2000). 
65. Jon Elster, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 1 (Jon Elster & 
Rune Slagstad eds., 1998). 
66. See MCKAY, supra note 9, at 55-58. 
67. See id. at 56-57 (describing instances where state legislatures in Illinois, New York, 
and Tennessee acted in ways that disadvantaged those in the states' more populous areas); 
see also BAKER, REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 48-51 (describing ex-
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equiproportional standard, so the story goes, broke the logjam and re­
stored principles of majority rule to our political institutions.68 
But there was nothing in the malapportionment problem that re­
quired such an exacting solution. The differences in voting power in 
Baker and Reynolds were, respectively, on the order of twenty and 
forty-one to one.69 The Court could have dealt with such large differ­
ences without a precise standard by merely issuing a general pro­
nouncement that it would not tolerate such large deviations.70 Devia­
tions on the order of two or three to one might have met with the 
Court's approval when some other substantial state interest was at 
stake. The malapportionment of the mid-twentieth century is one of 
those instances in which a court should have been able to remedy an 
egregious wrong without having to come up with a standard for what, 
exactly, is right.71 As Abner Mikva put it, "sometimes the Court 
wielding a sledgehammer helps, while a judge applying a scalpel does 
only harm. "72 
A second justification for the equiproportional standard is that it is 
"objective."73 It is argued to be an objective standard in at least two 
senses. First, it is objective in that it keeps judges from injecting their 
amples of state inaction on urban problems); HACKER, supra note 16, at 95-99 (discussing 
the impact of malapportioned seats on congressional decisions). 
68. See Guinier & Karlan, supra note 47, at 211. There are several good discussions of 
the success of the reapportionment cases in this regard. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Conse­
quences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. 
L. REV. 1, 90-94 (1984) (reviewing studies about the impact of state reapportionment on ex­
penditures in suburban and urban areas, minority representation, and party strength); 
Nathaniel Persily et al., The Complicated Impact of One Person, One Vote on Political Com­
petition and Representation, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1299 (2002) (examining the effect of the reap­
portionment decisions on various aspects of representation). 
As Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes argue, the potential for political lockup is an 
important justification for judicial intervention in democratic politics. See Samuel Issacharoff 
& Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998). 
69. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 545 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 245 
(1962) ( Douglas, J., concurring). 
70. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer points out that the early reapportionment cases provided (cor­
rectly, in his view) just such a standard; only later did the Court become more inflexible. See 
Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 60; see also Richard L. Hasen, The Benefits of "Judicially Un­
manageable" Standards in Election Cases Under the Equal Protection Clause, 80 N.C. L. 
REV. 1469 (2002) (arguing for "unmanageable" standards that would provide state and local 
governments with more flexibility in redistricting). 
71. See Martin Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA 
L. REV. 227, 227-29 (1985). 
72. Abner J. Mikva, Justice Brennan and the Political Process: Assessing the Legacy of 
Baker v. Carr, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 697 (1995). 
73. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 36, at 1648 (noting that the Supreme Court in the 
1960s considered the one person, one vote standard to be an objective, easily managed basis 
for political equality); Karlan, The Fire Next Time, supra note 46, at 741 (describing the one 
person, one vote standard as the "paradigmatic 'objective ' rule" that "seem[s] to avoid the 
invocation of a contestable political philosophy"). 
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own subjective political views into the redistricting process.74 The 
Supreme Court's initial reluctance to venture into the malapportion­
ment cases was driven by the concern that courts would be put in the 
position of making substantive political judgments, entangling the ju­
diciary in the political thicket.75 This trepidation manifested itself in 
the search for an "easily managed"76 standard. The Court viewed one 
person, one vote as just such a neutral, readily administrable basis for 
political equality,77 one that would not turn on a judge's political be­
lief, but instead upon the application of what Justice Stewart (deri­
sively) called "sixth-grade arithmetic."78 Thus, the argument continues, 
the standard is objective in that it prevents the judiciary from imposing 
its own subjective political beliefs in redistricting cases. 
This aspect of the standard's objectivity does not, unfortunately, 
carry us very far. It is limited in the sense that once courts restrict the 
range of possible redistricting plans to those that fall within an accept­
able range of deviation from the standard (even if that range is essen­
tially zero, .as it is with congressional districts), there are still many 
plans from which to choose. There are countless ways to slice the elec­
toral pie into equally sized pieces, and, as the Court has learned over 
the last forty years, deciding which way to divvy up the voters involves 
making substantive political judgments. To the extent the standard 
keeps judges from imposing their own political beliefs on the initial 
decision of acceptable district size, it fulfills this purpose no better 
than allowing any other decisionmaking mechanism outside the judici­
ary's hands - even pure chance - to determine it. Judges could have 
litigants draw straws, run a series of coin flips, or rely on random 
number generators to decide appropriate district sizes.79 Each of these 
is, in this sense, perfectly objective and judicially manageable -
74. This roughly corresponds to what Brian Leiter calls epistemic objectivity. See Brian 
Leiter, Introduction to OBJECTIVITY IN LA w AND MORALS 1, 1, 3 (Brian Leiter ed., 2001 ). 
The introduction to that volume, as well as the essays therein, provides an excellent discus­
sion of the concept of objectivity. 
75. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
76. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 620 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
courts are incompetent to make such decisions); Hasen, supra note 70, at 1475-80 (detailing 
the judicial search for manageable standards in early reapportionment decisions). 
77. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 732 (1983) (arguing that strict application of 
the equiproportional standard was required in order to make it justiciable); Baker, One Per­
son, One Vote, supra note 9, at 80-81 (arguing that the one person, one vote standard is more 
"durably neutral" than the alternatives); Issacharoff, supra note 36, at 1647, 1687. 
78. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 510 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (main­
taining that apportionment is "far too subtle and complicated a business to be resolved as a 
matter of constitutional law in terms of sixth-grade arithmetic"). 
79. Samuel Issacharoff recently made a similar point with respect to eliminating legisla­
tive self-interest in political gerrymandering. He proposes eliminating redistricting by in­
cumbent powers. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 593 (2002). 
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judges would be given no chance to inject their own beliefs into a dis­
tricting decision. 
But the absurdity of proposals that would produce such arbitrary 
results tells us that there must be something else to the objective na­
ture of the one person, one vote standard. Those who view the stan­
dard as objective must not merely mean that it excludes subjective 
considerations (in this case, the political views of the judiciary), but 
that it relates to some real object, something external to the judge's 
mind.80 And here, the external item, the thing that puts the object in 
objective, appears to be our shared ideas about democracy. 
Thus, it is argued, the equiproportional standard is somehow nec­
essary to the concept of democracy. Initially, because denial of an 
equally weighted vote can be redescribed, at some level, as the denial 
of the right to vote at all, the standard appears intrinsically linked to 
the very idea of casting a vote. This is what the Court was describing in 
Reynolds v. Sims when it said that "the right of suffrage can be denied 
by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as ef­
fectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise. "81 
The difference between being disallowed to cast a vote and allowed to 
cast a vote that only carries a thousandth of the weight of other votes 
is, at best, a theoretical one, and may not even be that.82 But as 
Nate Persily and others recently pointed out, this aspect of quantita­
tive vote dilution is best redescribed in the less romantic terms of giv­
ing each citizen "the equal probability of casting a tie-breaking vote 
regardless of the location of his or her residence, all other things being 
equal."83 And, they continue, all things are rarely equal, and the pres­
ence of uncompetitive districts and political and racial gerrymanders 
renders the one person, one vote standard relatively impotent in this 
regard.84 
Moreover, the equiproportional standard was viewed as essential 
to preserving majoritarian elements of our democracy.85 When there 
are deviations in district sizes, representatives elected by a minority of 
voters may constitute a majority in the governing body - in general, 
80. This corresponds to what Brian Leiter calls metaphysical objectivity. See Leiter, su­
pra note 74, at 1-3. 
81. 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). As discussed below, I agree with this assessment, though 
for what I think are different reasons. See infra text accompanying notes 204-230. 
82. See infra text accompanying notes 204-230. 
83. Persily et al., supra note 68, at 1311. 
84. Id. at 1313-14. This also explains, in part, the general failure of the reapportionment 
decisions to guarantee political equality, whatever that means. See infra text accompanying 
notes 101-119. 
85. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflec­
tions on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1146-48 (2002) 
(discussing this as one of the "core concepts of democratic theory" reflected in the reappor­
tionment decisions). 
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the larger the deviations, the smaller the controlling minority.s6 In­
deed, many of the Court's early decisions and much of the academic 
commentary in the area focused on the question of minority control, 
and quantified the magnitude of the malapportionment problem by 
pointing to the size of a possible controlling minority, not the devia­
tions in district size.s7 
This, of course, is a legitimate concern, but only to the extent that 
we embrace a strict commitment to majority rule. And it is clear from 
the structure of some of our most important political institutions -
the Senate and the Presidency, for example - that we are not so 
committed. Nor has the Supreme Court ever stated that strict adher­
ence to majoritarian principles is what drove its later one person, one 
vote decisions with respect to other institutions. While the early 
malapportionment cases involved districts that gave rise to the possi­
bility that relatively small minorities would control the statehouse, 
those, as discussed above, could be eliminated by a requirement that 
districts be of roughly equal sizes. The Court, therefore, has not been 
particularly clear in spelling out the theoretical reasons driving such 
strict adherence to the equiproportional principle. 
Given the Court's relative silence on the theoretical or constitu­
tional justification for the one person, one vote rule, most commenta­
tors have been left to cobble together fragments of language here and 
there in the opinions in an attempt to divine the Court's reasoning.ss 
86. Take, for example, a hypothetical state with 100,000 people divided into ten districts. 
If six of the districts have 8000 people each, and the other four have 13,000, the total devia­
tion from the ideal district size is 50%, and 48% of the state 's population can, theoretically, 
elect a controlling majority in the statehouse. If, on the other hand, the six smaller districts 
have 6000 people each, and the other four districts have 16,000, the total deviation from the 
ideal district size is 100%, and 36% of the state's population can elect a controlling majority 
in the statehouse. (Of course, the relationship between the total deviation and the size of a 
possible controlling majority not only depends upon the total deviation - which only takes 
account of the largest and smallest district - but the size of the districts in between as well.) 
87. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 545 (1964) ("Under the existing provisions, 
applying 1960 census figures, only 25. 1 % of the State's total population resided in districts 
represented by a majority of the members of the Senate, and only 25.7% lived in counties 
which could elect a majority of the members of the House of Representatives."); MCKAY, 
supra note 9, at 46-47 (listing the minimum percentage of the population that can elect a 
majority of representatives in each of the fifty state legislative bodies). McKay discusses the 
common use of this measure of quantitative dilution, known as the Dauer-Kelsay measure of 
representativeness, and its use by the Supreme Court. Id. at 43-45. 
As Guy Charles recently argued, the one person, one vote standard may also be 
grounded in other core concepts of democracy, such as responsiveness, substantial political 
equality, and pluralism. See Charles, supra note 85, at 1 148-62. But some of these concepts, 
like responsiveness, do not require strict adherence to the standard, and the others require 
making fairly obvious choices in democratic theory (that is, they do not appear to be "core" 
concepts common to all theories of democracy). Charles does not deny this; indeed, he be­
lieves that "judges can - and must - utilize democratic theory" in interpreting the Consti­
tution. Id. at 1162. 
88. See, e.g., Heather Gerken, Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 
1420-27 (2002) (arguing that the Court could have fleshed out its notion of equality in at 
least four different ways, but did not do so); Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A 
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Many conclude, correctly, I think, that the Court never offers a coher­
ent theoretical basis for the standard.89 And so when Heather Gerken 
calls the Court's justifications at best "minimally theorized,"90 she is 
being quite charitable. 
2. Limitations and Criticisms of the Standard 
Despite its basic appeal, the equiproportional standard is not with­
out its limitations. Initially, the standard does not apply to many im­
portant political institutions. The most obvious example is the U.S. 
Senate.91 Under our constitutional structure, the two senators from 
Wyoming represent 495,304 people while the two from California rep­
resent 33,930,798.92 This exception to the one person, one vote stan­
dard was constitutionalized as part of the compromise necessary to get 
the less populous colonies to join the Union.93 And because each 
state's power in the Electoral College is derived, in part, from its rep­
resentation in the Senate, the standard also does not apply to the 
Presidency.94 This, of course, helps explain the possibility that a presi­
dential candidate may win the popular vote but lose the election.95 
And, as discussed more fully below, on the state and local level there 
are a host of special-purpose districts that are not subject to the one 
person, one vote standard.96 
Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1269, 1307-21 (2002) (discussing the standard as 
possibly restoring the dignity of an individual's vote, the possibility of competition in elec­
tions, and "accurate" representation). 
89. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 88, at 1434-36. 
90. Id. at 1427-28. 
91. See U. S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. For some critiques of this aspect of the Senate, see 
ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC Is THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 46-54 (2002); 
Suzanna Sherry, Our Unconstitutional Senate, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 95 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998). 
92. See MILLS, supra note 41, at 2 tbl.l. 
93. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 571-77 (1964) (explaining the unique historical 
circumstances that gave rise to the United States Senate and rejecting the federal analogy in 
cases of state reapportionment); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 9-14 (1964) (explaining 
what became known as the "Great Compromise" that broke the deadlock between delegates 
from large and small states at the Constitutional Convention); HACKER, supra note 16, at 34. 
94. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
95. This has now happened four times in American history: 1824, 1876, 1888, and 2000. 
Mark A. Siegel, It's Time to Reform Electoral College Before Next Crisis, ROLL CALL, Jan. 
15, 2001 , at B34. 
96. See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (exempting a water-storage district from 
the strict demands of one person, one vote); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Storage Dist., 410 U. S. 719 (1973) (same). For a more thorough discussion, see infra text ac­
companying notes 186-203. 
The equiproportional standard also does not apply to judicial elections. See Wells v. 
Edward, 347 F. Supp. 453, 454 (M.D. La. 1972), affd mem., 409 U.S. 1095 (1973) (affirming 
the district court's determination that one person, one vote does not apply to the judiciary). 
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Even the legislative bodies that the standard was designed for -
state legislatures and Congress - are not required to adhere precisely 
to the one person, one vote standard.97 State legislative districts may 
deviate up to 10% without justification, more if the state provides suf­
ficient reasons for the range.98 Congressional districts, while equally 
sized within each state, vary quite a bit from state to state because the 
Constitution prohibits congressional districts from crossing state bor­
ders.99 As a result, after the most recent round of redistricting, the 
congressional district in Wyoming has a population of 495,304, while 
the one in Montana has a population of 905,316.100 Thus, the first im­
portant limit on the one person, one vote principle is that many of our 
most basic institutions are not subject to the standard at all and others 
that are subject to it have a fair amount of flexibility in how they ad­
here to it. 
For the democratic institutions that are subject to the standard, the 
elegance of the phrase "one person, one vote" masks some complexi­
ties. The foremost among these is what, exactly, is meant by "person." 
To put it another way, what apportionment base should we use to en­
sure equal representation? A list of possible candidates, from most to 
least comprehensive, includes total population,101 voting-age popula­
tion,102 voter-eligible population,103 registered voters, and actual vot-
97. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 741-43 (1973) (explaining two distinct lines 
of cases concerning congressional redistricting and state legislative apportionment). 
98. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 
324-25, 329, modified, 411 U.S. 922 (1973) (suggesting that a 16.4% maximum deviation 
"may well approach tolerable limits"). 
99. This presumably comes out of the mandate that "Representatives . . .  shall be appor­
tioned among the several States . . . .  " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 2. 
100. See Mills, supra note 41, at 1, 4. 
101. In the early malapportionment cases, the disparities were analyzed in terms of dif­
ferences in the population per representative or the percentage of the population that could 
elect a controlling majority in the statehouse. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 
(1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
102. For a discussion of the possibility of using voting-age population to limit the appor­
tionment base, see Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 773-77 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(rejecting apportionment based on numbers of voting-age citizens). 
103. This would limit the pool to those who were both of voting age and not disqualified 
by some other state voting requirement. The most notable groups excluded from the appor­
tionment base would be aliens, transients, and those convicted of certain crimes. For a dis­
cussion of the possibility of using citizenship voting requirements to limit the apportionment 
base, see Garza, 918 F.2d at 773-76; id. at 779-88 (Kozinski, J., concurring in part and dis­
senting in part); Dennis L. Murphy, Note, The Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from the Reappor­
tionment Base: A Question of Representation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 969 (1991) (arguing 
that the inclusion of illegal aliens in the reapportionment base violates one person, one 
vote). For a short discussion of disenfranchised felons and ex-felons in the apportionment 
base, see Robert W. Bennett, Should Parents Be Given Extra Votes on Account of Their 
Children?: Toward a Conversational Understanding of American Democracy, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 503, 530-31 (2000). For a general discussion of the effects of including (and excluding) 
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ers.104 And while the Supreme Court originally spoke of equal num­
bers of "residents, or citizens, or voters,"105 as if equal numbers of each 
guaranteed the same sort of equality, the Court later acknowledged 
that they do not, reasoning that "if it is the weight of a person's vote 
that matters, total population . . .  may not actually reflect that body of 
voters whose votes must be counted and weighed for the purposes of 
reapportionment, because 'census persons' are not voters."106 While 
the Court seems to have settled on total population as the relevant sta­
tistic for congressional redistricting,107 it allows states significant lee­
way in devising an apportionment base for state and local voting dis­
tricts.108 But these variations may be at odds with the phrase itself and 
affect the weighting of votes (and, in any case, are not without contro­
versy ).109 
Once we accept the relevant figure for determining district size 
(usually, population), we are still a long way from guaranteeing each 
person numerically equal representation. The main obstacle is that the 
source of the population figures - the census - has several short­
comings for districting purposes. Initially, census numbers are far from 
various non-voting groups from the apportionment base, see Levinson, supra note 88, at 
1281-97. 
104. Use of registered or actual voters as the apportionment base has not been much of 
an issue since the Supreme Court noted a possible "problem" with the use of a registered 
voter base or actual voter base. See Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966). The Court 
found that such bases were unlikely to survive judicial scrutiny because they may be subject 
to improper political influence that perpetuates the underrepresentation of some minority 
groups and because they are subject to sudden fluctuations. See id. at 92-93. 
105. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577; see New York City Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 
688, 693 ( 1989) ("Electoral systems should strive to make each citizen's portion equal." (em­
phasis added)). 
106. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 746 (1973); see Burns, 384 U.S. at 91-93; 
Garza, 918 F.2d at 773-76; id. at 779-88 (Kozinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
107. This appears to be mandated by the constitutional requirement that the "whole 
number of free persons" in each state shall be used to apportion representatives, see U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, and much of the language in 
the congressional apportionment cases, see, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 ( 1964). But 
see Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 534-35 ( 1969) (assuming without deciding that con­
gressional apportionment may be based on voter population rather than total population). 
108. See, e.g., Burns, 384 U.S. at 91 ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require 
the States to use total population figures derived from the federal census as the standard by 
which this substantial population equivalency is to be measured."). The Court went on to 
note that in no case had it suggested that "the States are required to include aliens, tran­
sients, short term or temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction of crime, 
in the apportionment base by which the legislators are distributed and against which compli­
ance with the Equal Protection Clause is to be measured." Id. at 92. 
109. Sanford Levinson points out some even more basic problems with what he terms 
the "mantra" of one person, one vote. He notes that it "does not - indeed cannot, as a mat­
ter of common sense - mean that every single person within the polity gets a (single) vote." 
Levinson, supra note 88, at 1270-71. Children, felons, and resident aliens, among others, 
have no federally protected right to vote. See id. at 1271-73. 
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perfect.110 The census overcounts some populations, undercounts oth­
ers, and is prohibited from correcting systemic errors of this sort 
through statistical techniques such as sampling.11 1  As a result, areas 
with large numbers of people missed by the census, often with large 
minority populations, are numerically underrepresented.112 And even 
assuming a perfect decennial census, those numbers only provide a 
snapshot of a dynamic demographic process. The census numbers 
rapidly become outdated as people are born, die, and move.113 Of 
course, a few imperfections in the census are far from a reason to dis­
card the whole enterprise, for any undertaking of that size is bound to 
have some slippage. But such imperfections do swamp the precise tol­
erances built into the law governing some types of redistricting.114 
The most serious shortcoming of the equiproportional standard, 
however, is not its limited range or imperfect application, but its fail­
ure to achieve the goal of equal representation. The Warren Court, in 
concentrating on individual voting equality, overlooked the group na­
ture of meaningful political representation.115 So in the late 1960s, 
while our democratic institutions reconfigured themselves into dis­
tricts that equalized individual voting power, they also employed prac­
tices like at-large elections and racial gerrymandering to effectively 
110. See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 745 & n.10. 
111. See Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, 
African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1165 (1997); Samuel 
Issacharoff & Allan J. Lichtman, The Census Undercount and Minority Representation: The 
Constitutional Obligation of the States to Guarantee Equal Representation, 13 REV. L!TIG. 1, 
2-13 (1993). When the Census Bureau announced a plan to use statistical sampling in the 
decennial census of 2000 to remedy the growing problem of undercounting some identifiable 
groups, the plan was challenged and held invalid under the Census Act, 13 U.S.C. §§ 1-401 
(2000), in Dep't of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 
(1999). Indeed, the mere fact that sampling is so politically contested lends support to the 
idea that there is nothing objective about the one person, one vote standard. 
112. See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 745 n.10 (noting the fact that the 1970 census under­
counted blacks by an estimated 7.7% and whites by an estimated 1 .9%). 
113. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 98-100 (1997); Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 746. 
Sanford Levinson notes that the population numbers used for congressional elections are 
only good for, at best, one election in the five covered by each new set of census data. See 
Levinson, supra note 88, at 1278-80. 
114. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 778 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("More than a 
decade's experience with Kirkpatrick demonstrates that insistence on precise numerical 
equality only invites those who Jost in the political arena to refight their battles in federal 
court."); Karlan, The Fire Next Time, supra note 46, at 735 ("While the Jaw requires that dis­
trict populations be as equal as practicable, nobody really sues because the congressional 
district to which he has been assigned has 527,472 voters while another district has only 
523,798."); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 
TEXAS L. REV. 1705, 1730 (1993) [hereinafter Karlan, The Rights To Vote] (describing one 
person, one vote claims as " 'vehicle lawsuits,' empty of any real content but pregnant with 
the possibility of persuading a court to adopt a favorable new plan"). 
1 15. See GUINIER, supra note 2, at 124-25. 
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shut certain groups out of the political process.116 These new practices, 
which "qualitatively" diluted votes, became the new constitutional and 
statutory battleground for voting rights.117 Thus, as it turned out, even 
if the equiproportional standard is a necessary condition for achieving 
the goal of fair and effective representation, it is far from a sufficient 
one.118 And judged by the lofty goals set for the standard by its crea­
tors, it has been, in Pam Karlan's words, "a spectacular failure."119 
116. See DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION, supra note 19, at 22 ("A mathemati­
cally equal vote which is politically worthless because of gerrymandering or winner-take-all 
districting is as deceiving as 'emperor's clothes.' "); Richard L. Engstrom, The Supreme 
Court and Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair and 
Effective Representation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277 (examining the relationship between the 
requirement of population equity and gerrymandering); Issacharoff, supra note 36, at 1654 
(explaining how advances in computer technology make it easier to gerrymander equipopu­
lous districts); Karlan, The Fire Next Time, supra note 46, at 736 (noting that "[t]he 'equi­
populous gerrymander' is a staple of modern reapportionment"). 
117. Originally, in cases such as Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), and White v. 
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), qualitative vote dilution claims were pursued under the Con­
stitution. After the constitutional claims were undercut by the Supreme Court's opinion in 
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (requiring that plaintiffs with such claims prove 
discriminatory intent), Congress amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act when it came 
up for reauthorization in 1982 to include qualitative dilution claims. Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
1973 (2000)). Thereafter, section 2 became the weapon of choice for voting rights advocates. 
Constitutional qualitative vote dilution claims brought by white plaintiffs rose to prominence 
in the 1990s, most notoriously in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). For a very brief sum­
mary of qualitative vote dilution, see Hayden, supra note 4, at 94-98. 
1 18. See Baker, One Person, One Vote, supra note 9, at 90; Barbara Y. Phillips, Recon­
sidering Reynolds v. Sims: The Relevance of Its Basic Standard of Equality to Other Vote 
Dilution Claims, 38 How. L.J. 561, 564-65 (1995). 
119. Karlan, The Rights To Vote, supra note 114, at 1705. Chief Justice Earl Warren 
considered the reapportionment cases the most important in his sixteen years on the Court. 
See G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 337 (1982); Engstrom, supra note 
116, at 277. 
This does not, of course, exhaust the possible shortcomings of the equiproportional 
standard. See, e.g., ALFRED DE GRAZIA, APPORTIONMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT (1963) (cataloging some early predictions about the negative consequences 
of Baker v. Carr); Bruce E. Cain, Election Law as a Field: A Political Scientist's Perspective, 
32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1105, 1 110 (1999) (arguing that applying the one person, one vote 
standard to local governments prevents the formation of the regional governmental entities 
necessary to solve problems like growth and traffic management); Alfred De Grazia, The 
Applied Science of Equality: The Case of Apportionment, with Special Attention to the Idea of 
£qui-Populous Districts, in REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION, supra note 9, at 
169, 188-89 (arguing that the equiproportional standard is a bad idea because, among other 
things, it takes power away from the legislature, runs contrary to our federalist system of 
government, and takes attention away from more serious issues); James A. Gardner, One 
Person, One Vote and the Possibility of Political Community, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1237, 1239-43 
(2002) (arguing that one person, one vote cannot support "thicker" conceptions of democ­
racy such as communitarianism and civic republicanism); James L. McDowell, "One Person, 
One Vote" and the Decline of Community, 23 LEGAL STUD. F. 131 (1999) (arguing that the 
equiproportional standard contributed to the decline of the concept of community of inter­
est); Joseph Seliga, Democratic Solutions to Urban Problems, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 5 
(2001) (arguing that "the need to ensure equality of votes consistent with the 'one person, 
one vote' doctrine hinders the development of democratic governing structures and innova­
tive solutions to urban problems"). 
November 2003] The False Promise of One Person, One Vote 235 
In sum, the theoretical arguments for and against the equipropor­
tional standard are unsatisfying. One reason they disappoint, I think, is 
that they fail to go far enough. For example, Justice Frankfurter was 
clearly onto something when he said that the Court in Baker v. Carr 
was being asked "to choose among competing bases of representation 
- ultimately, really, among competing theories of political philoso­
phy . . . .  "120 But it is unclear exactly why Frankfurter framed the ques­
tion this way. Why is such a choice about bases of representation dif­
ferent from the other acceptable choices the Court made in deciding 
that states could not altogether deny the vote to certain groups? An­
other shortcoming is that the current explanations appear unrelated to 
other aspects of voting rights, such as those involving access to the 
ballot box on one hand and qualitative vote dilution on the other. 
Thus, while I think commentators like Barbara Phillips are right in 
pointing out that quantitative and qualitative dilution claims must be 
related,121 there is little explanation of how they are related. The whole 
subject demands a more thorough, perhaps more deeply rooted, ex­
planation. 
A more satisfying explanation of the standard would clarify the 
relationship between weighting votes and democratic fairness. In do­
ing so, it would need to tie the one person, one vote standard to other 
aspects of voting rights. It would, for example, connect the standard to 
the reasons invoked to disallow certain people to vote in the first 
place. It would help explain why we allow deviations from the stan­
dard in some cases. And, perhaps most importantly, it may even allow 
us to bridge the gap between quantitative vote dilution claims and 
qualitative ones. Many jurists and commentators view these two types 
of vote dilution claims as distinct concepts - the former involving 
"individual rights" and the latter "group rights." They are, therefore, 
treated differently under the law, and seem related only in the vague 
sense that each involves an allocation of political power. A more com­
plete, unified theory of voting rights would tie the two types of claims 
together at some more fundamental level. 
Such a theory, I think, must come out of an analysis of why we 
think it is a good idea to assign every voter an equally weighted vote. 
Voting, after all, involves revealing preferences, and counting votes 
involves aggregating those preferences. It seems, then, that figuring 
out how much weight should be given to a person's vote means figur­
ing out how much weight should be accorded to each person's prefer­
ences. And because there is apparently no scale for weighing prefer-
120. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
121. See Phillips, supra note 118, at 583; see also John R. Low-Beer, The Constitutional 
Imperative of Proportional Representation, 94 YALE L.J. 163, 163-64, 175-82 (1999) (noting 
the false distinction between the individual rights protected in the quantitative dilution cases 
and the group rights protected in the qualitative ones). 
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ences, we need to weigh them in relation to each other. And that, in 
turn, brings us to something that has been giving philosophers and 
economists fits for a long time - the problem of making interpersonal 
utility comparisons. 
II. INTERPERSONAL UTILITY COMPARISONS 
A. The Problem of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons 
A necessary element of many ethical systems, especially utilitarian 
ones, is the ability to measure utility, broadly conceived as people's 
well-being.122 Any measure of well-being involves comparing the 
amount of goods people possess. With material goods - such as in­
come, wealth, and physical health - making such comparisons is not 
that difficult. While there may be problems in measuring the amount 
of any material good possessed by a particular individual (indeed, 
there are entire subdisciplines devoted to the task), the difficulties are 
mostly practical rather than theoretical.123 In any case, the problems 
pale in comparison with the difficulties associated with making com­
parisons of more subjective goods. 
Comparisons of subjective goods involve looking at things such as 
people's mental health, their freedom from anxiety, their sense of sat­
isfaction - in short, their levels of happiness.124 Because we don't like 
the paternalism (and the mistakes) involved in telling people what 
should make them happy, we often take people's own preferences as 
the baseline of the inquiry and assess their well-being by looking at 
whether these preferences are satisfied.125 Thus, the project involves 
122. For a good, brief discussion of the concept of utility and its relationship to welfare, 
see Alfred F. MacKay, Extended Sympathy and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, 83 J. 
PHIL. 305, 306-07 (1986). 
123. See Martin Barrett & Daniel Hausman, Making Interpersonal Comparisons Coher­
ently, 6 ECON. & PHIL. 293, 293 (1990). 
124. See id. 
125. See Daniel M. Hausman, The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, 
104 MIND 415, 415 (1995) [hereinafter Hausman I]. Hausman discusses this view, criticizes it, 
and concludes that we should not equate welfare with the satisfaction of preferences. Id. at 
486. His position was criticized by Ruth Weintraub in The Impossibility of Interpersonal 
Utility Comparisons: A Critical Note, 105 MIND 661 (1996), and defended (successfully, I 
think) in Daniel M. Hausman, The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons - A 
Reply, 106 MIND 99 (1997) [hereinafter Hausman II] .  That said, preference satisfaction, or 
versions of it, is still one of the most often used measures of well-being, see Barrett & 
Hausman, supra note 123, at 293-94; see also Thomas M. Scanlon, The Moral Basis of Inter­
personal Comparisons, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 17, 22-44 (Jon 
Elster & John E. Roemer eds., 1991), and also seems appropriate in the context of voting 
rights, where the goal is to translate individual preferences into group choices. But while I 
use preference satisfaction because it is one of the most well-investigated means to make 
interpersonal comparisons, my argument does not depend upon it as opposed to some other 
measure of well-being that turns, in some sense, on psychological goods. Nor, I should men­
tion, does my basic point depend upon the difference between the "actual" preferences used 
by economists and the "rational" or "informed" preferences used by ethical theorists. 
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comparing, say, Luke's level of satisfaction of his preferences with 
Emma's level of satisfaction of hers. Such interpersonal comparisons 
of preference satisfaction are crucial to giving a full account of well­
being because people may possess similar amounts of material goods 
but experience different levels of satisfaction - some may be com­
pletely satisfied and others very dissatisfied.126 Making assessments of 
such psychological goods, however, involves tackling a host of difficul­
ties in what is collectively known as the problem with interpersonal 
utility comparisons.127 
The overarching problem with interpersonal utility comparisons is, 
quite simply, that we cannot make them without making the value 
judgments we seek to avoid. This makes the distribution of material 
goods problematic. If, for example, we want to choose a single dessert 
for Luke and Emma, we could ask them whether they prefer jello or 
ice cream. If they both prefer one or the other, then our decision is 
easy. But if Luke prefers jello, and Emma prefers ice cream, things be­
come harder. At that point, we would want to determine whether jello 
is higher in Luke's preference ranking than ice cream is in Emma's. 
But making such interpersonal comparisons is fraught with difficulties. 
As Lionel Robbins recognized in the early 1930s: 
There is no means of testing the magnitude of A 's satisfaction as compared 
with B's. If we tested the state of their blood-streams, that would be a 
test of blood, not satisfaction. Introspection does not enable A to meas­
ure what is going on in B's mind, nor B to measure what is going on in 
A's. There is no way of comparing the satisfactions of different people.128 
Robbins's point was not new - a similar point was made, for example, 
by Jevons in 1871129 - but it seized the imaginations of a generation 
126. Or, as the Beatles pointed out more succinctly, "Money can't buy me love" - or 
many other subjective goods that contribute to well-being. THE BEATLES, CAN'T BUY ME 
LOVE (Capitol Records 1964). 
127. One of the best places to start investigating the problems associated with interper­
sonal utility comparisons is INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note 
125, which contains a well-written introduction as well as a good cross section of the scholar­
ship on the issue. James Griffin steps through some of the more obvious problems in JAMES 
GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 1 13-20 
(1986). And Peter Hammond provides a particularly useful bibliography in Peter J. 
Hammond, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and How They Are and Should Be 
Made, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note 125, at 200, 238-54. 
Despite the obvious connection to any study of law and economics, there has not been 
an overwhelming amount of commentary on interpersonal utility comparisons among legal 
scholars. For a relatively brief discussion of the role of interpersonal utility comparisons in 
law and economics, see Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 60-71 
(1992). 
128. LORD ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC 
SCIENCE 139-40 (3d ed. 1984). 
129. See W. STANLEY JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (5th ed. 1965). 
Jevons noted: 
[T]here is never, in any single instance, an attempt to compare the amount of feeling in one 
mind with that in another. I see no means by which such comparison can be accomplished. 
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(or two) of economists. Faced with the fact that interpersonal utility 
comparisons are based on unverifiable evidence, economists struc­
tured their views of efficiency and social welfare accordingly.°0 This 
reluctance to make interpersonal comparisons, for example, accounts 
for the prominence (or dominance) of Pareto optimality as a method 
of making social-welfare comparisons.131 And the fact that such meth­
ods are re.latively feeble makes finding a solution to the problem of in­
terpersonal utility comparisons all the more pressing. 
The susceptibility of one mind may, for what we know, be a thousand times greater than that 
of another. But provided that the susceptibility was different in a like ratio in all directions, 
we should never be able to discover the difference. Every mind is thus inscrutable to every 
other mind, and no common denominator of feeling seems to be possible . . . .  [T]he motive 
in one mind is weighed only against other motives in the same mind, never against the mo­
tives in other minds. 
Id. at 14. 
Except for some of the terminology, Jevons's quote may just have well come out of a re­
cent issue of Mind. 
130. See Barrett & Hausman, supra note 123, at 293-94. For a brief sketch of the history 
of the avoidance of interpersonal utility comparisons, see Hammond, supra note 127, at 204-
07. Amartya Sen provides a useful survey of the literature of social choice theory without 
interpersonal comparisons in Social Choice Theory, in 3 HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL 
ECONOMICS 1073 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Michael D. Intriligator eds., 1986) . 
Law and economics scholars have, for the most part, embraced the typical distaste for in­
terpersonal utility comparisons. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF 
JUSTICE 79 (1981) ("The 'interpersonal comparison of utilities' is anathema to the modem 
economist, and rightly so, because there is no metric for making such a comparison."). But 
see Richard A. Epstein, Rights and Rights Talk, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1106, 1118 (1992) (book 
review) (acknowledging that "(m]ost of us are quite happy to make such (interpersonal util­
ity] comparisons, and do so with confidence, every day of our lives"). For a general discus­
sion, see Lawson, supra note 127, at 61 n.26 (citing a variety of sources discussing the inter­
personal comparison of utilities, including sources arguing that such comparison is not 
impossible). 
131. See Hammond, supra note 127, at 206. The Pareto Criterion, developed by Vilfredo 
Pareto in 1897, is a method of determining whether a change in a given state of affairs is effi­
cient or "optimal." Simply put, a change is said to increase the welfare of society if at least 
one member of the group is made better off without anyone being made worse off. Though 
Pareto's criterion is somewhat limited, it does have the advantage of avoiding interpersonal 
comparisons. As James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock point out: 
The underlying premise of the modern Paretian construction is the purely individualistic 
one. The individual himself is assumed to be the only one who is able to measure or to quan­
tify his own utility or satisfaction. No external observer is presumed able to make compari­
sons of utility among separate individuals. 
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 171-72 (1962) . The disadvantage of reli­
ance on Pareto optimality, however, is its incompleteness. As Sen notes: 
An economy can be optimal in this sense even when some people are rolling in luxury and 
others are near starvation as long as the starvers cannot be made better off without cutting 
into the pleasures of the rich. If preventing the burning of Rome would have made Emperor 
Nero feel worse off, then letting him burn Rome would have been Pareto optimal. In short, a 
society or an economy can be Pareto-optimal and still be perfectly disgusting. 
AMARTY A K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 22 ( 1970) . 
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One possible way to solve the problem is to limit our inquiry to or­
dinal, not cardinal, preference rankings.132 For example, we could eas­
ily find out whether Luke prefers jello to ice cream (as opposed to how 
much more he prefers it): we could run a series of experiments that 
force him to choose between the two, or, more simply, we could ask 
him. And, say, we find out that Luke prefers jello to ice cream. Simi­
larly, we can discover Emma's (or anyone else's) ordinal preference 
ranking with respect to the two desserts (and, say she, unlike Luke, 
prefers ice cream to jello ). At least theoretically, we could do this with 
their preferences over any goods or states of affairs. Then, with a 
complete ordering of both individuals' preferences in hand, we could 
compare the two and make our decision about whether to buy jello or 
ice cream. 
Such a comparison might take different forms. We could, for ex­
ample, count the levels in between jello and ice cream in both prefer­
ence orders (which would, of course, include preferences for many 
other things) , and then decide that, because Luke has fewer prefer­
ence levels between jello and ice cream, he must be more indifferent 
about the choice than Emma. Hence, we buy the ice cream. Or we 
could count up from the very bottom (or down from the top) of each 
child's preference ranking to discern who would derive more satisfac­
tion by the choice of their favored dessert.133 Thus, if we restrict our­
selves to ordinal preference rankings, it seems we can, at least theo­
retically, make the interpersonal utility comparisons that we desire. 
Closer scrutiny of this process, however, reveals the many assump­
tions (and flaws) inherent in such comparisons of ordinal preference 
rankings. While it may be easy to imagine a fully satisfied or dissatis­
fied person, what about all of the intermediate preference rankings -
how does one locate such a preference ranking in a way that lends it­
self to meaningful comparison? Counting from the extremes, or be­
tween two alternatives, is easier said than done. One problem is that, 
once you include lotteries among alternatives as well as alternatives, 
there are an infinite number of levels in anyone's preference rank­
ings.134 Another problem is that the number of alternatives above or 
below a given choice might depend on morally irrelevant factors, such 
as one's knowledge or capacity for imagination.135 If, in the example 
above, we restrict ourselves to desserts, Luke's knowledge of or ca­
pacity to imagine more desserts than Emma may help him if we're 
counting up from the bottom of both preference orders (since, pre-
132. See Hausman I, supra note 125, at 475-77. 
133. See id. at 476. Of course, without any evidence that Luke and Emma have exactly 
the same number of preferences in their rankings, counting up from the bottom and down 
from the top of each ranking might yield different results. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. 
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sumably, jello will be further from his bottom than ice cream from 
Emma's bottom) or counting the alternatives between jello and ice 
cream (his many as opposed to Emma's few), but may hurt him if 
we're counting down from the top (since, given Emma's limited 
imagination, ice cream may be closer to her top). Finally, Luke, 
Emma, and the rest of us are often tempted to misrepresent our pref­
erences in order to gain more of a scarce good, be it dessert or some­
thing with which you can buy dessert, like a tax break.136 
These problems tell us that although they may be enough to get 
market analysis off the ground, ordinal utilities are not the way to 
make interpersonal utility comparisons.137 They also demonstrate that 
counting the alternatives above, below, or between are really attempts 
to assign quasi-cardinal significance to certain differences in individual 
rankings. Making judgments based on the number of steps between 
preference levels assumes we are talking about equally sized steps. 
Such quasi-cardinal rankings, however, don't make sense. In the first 
place, they are not stable, in that adding (or removing) an option in­
creases (or diminishes) the distinctions among some options but not 
others. In addition, quasi-cardinal rankings are not, generally, consis­
tent with a person's actual cardinal rankings. In sum, we cannot make 
interpersonal comparisons without comparing preference intervals, 
and these quasi-cardinal systems do not contain the right information 
- we need cardinal rankings. Thus, we must reject this stripped-down, 
ordinal version of interpersonal utility comparison. 
A second way of solving the problem involves moving to full­
blown cardinal utilities. That is, we need to look at each person's car­
dinal scale and then calibrate it with the scales of others. The calibra­
tion is, of course, the hard part, and economists and philosophers have 
taken two basic approaches. Some attempt to convert the interper­
sonal comparisons to intrapersonal comparisons. Others attempt to 
place preferences on a shared numerical scale, from zero (least pre­
ferred) to one (most preferred). 
Converting interpersonal comparisons to intrapersonal ones in­
volves putting oneself in another's shoes in order to make a compari­
son.138 In order to compare what it would be like to be Luke with jello 
to Emma with ice cream, we imagine what it would be like to be him 
with jello and what it would be like to be her with ice cream. We then 
convert those difficult interpersonal comparisons into intrapersonal 
ones, which are, by most accounts, less problematic.139 It is not that 
136. This problem is by no means limited to comparisons of ordinal utility levels. 
137. I am especially indebted to Stephen Ellis for the discussion in this paragraph. 
138. A good critical discussion of this solution (and its many versions) may be found in 
MacKay, supra note 122, at 305-22; see also Hausman I, supra note 125, at 477-78. 
139. See Hausman I, supra note 125, at 477-78; MacKay, supra note 122, at 305-06. But 
see Gregory S. Kavka, Is Individual Choice Less Problematic than Collective Choice?, 7 
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controversial, for example, for me to say that Luke is better off with 
jello than ice cream if and only if he prefers jello to ice cream (in­
trapersonal comparison). Likewise, I can make comparisons between 
people by saying that Luke is better off with jello than Emma is with 
ice cream (interpersonal comparison) if and only if I prefer Luke with 
jello to Emma with ice cream (intrapersonal comparison).140 Impor­
tantly, when making this conversion, I leave my personal preferences 
behind: that is, I imagine myself as Luke, with Luke's preferences and 
a bowl of jello; I imagine myself as Emma, with Emma's preferences 
and a bowl of ice cream; and then I ask myself in whose position I 
would prefer to be.141 Thus, by engaging in what Alfred MacKay color­
fully calls the "mental shoehorn maneuver,"142 I can make interper­
sonal utility comparisons. 
This is the principal way that philosophers and welfare economists 
have dealt with interpersonal comparisons. Kenneth Arrow,143 R.M. 
Hare,144 and John Harsanyi,145 for example, have put forth versions of 
it.146 Some, like Hare, believe that the maneuver can be made in such a 
way as to actually induce the experiences of others in oneself in order 
to compare them.147 Others, like Harsanyi, make the milder claim that 
the maneuver merely places one in position to make a certain counter­
factual judgment, that if I were in Luke's position with his preferences, 
I would have such an experience.148 And while many express doubts 
ECON. & PHIL. 143, 143-45 (1991) (arguing that, on certain assumptions, all of the problems 
with social choice reappear at the personal level). 
140. See Hausman I, supra note 125, at 477. 
141. Id. 
142. MacKay, supra note 122, at 305 & n.l. 
143. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social 
Choice, 7 PHILOSOPHIA 223, 223-37 (1978). Arrow, however, admits of some lurking prob­
lems in the approach: 
[I]f your satisfaction depends on some inner qualities that I do not possess, then I really have 
not had the experience which will enable me to judge the satisfaction one would derive from 
that quality in association with some distribution of goods. Hence, my judgment has a prob­
ability element in it and therefore will not agree with your judgment. 
Id. at 236. 
144. See R .M . HARE, MORAL THINKING 87-106, 117-29 (1981). 
145. See, e.g., JOHN C. HARSANYI, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING 
EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS 58-59 (1977); John C. Harsanyi, Morality 
and the Theory of Rational Behavior, 44 Soc. RES. 623, 638 (1977). 
146. There are, of course, other adherents. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY 14-15 (1973); Donald Davidson, Judging Interpersonal Interests, in 
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY (J. Eisler & A. Hylland eds., 1986). 
147. See HARE, supra note 144, at 117-21. 
148. See HARSANYI, supra note 145, at 58. While Amartya Sen points out that there are 
at least two versions of this type of maneuver (which he terms "introspective welfare com­
parison" and "introspective as if choice"), see Amartya Sen, Interpersonal Comparisons of 
242 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:213 
about the enterprise, they often see it as the most promising way to 
make interpersonal comparisons - and the moral systems that de­
pend upon them - work. 
The solution, however, is subject to many criticisms, and may ulti­
mately fail to give a coherent account of interpersonal comparisons. It 
is too information intensive to use on a large scale: we lack this kind of 
data on each person's preference rankings149 and, even if we could get 
it (through polling or some other device) ,  we would worry about stra­
tegic misrepresentations of those preferences. Moreover, one's imag­
ining about what it is like to be another person is often contaminated 
by her thoughts about the kind of changes she would have to undergo 
to get there.150 But the most straightforward criticism is that, to the ex­
tent I can put myself in another's shoes, there is no "me" left to make 
the comparison.151 That is, I may be able to imagine what Luke thinks 
of jello and Emma thinks of ice cream, but I still cannot compare the 
intensities of their subjective states with any authority, especially the 
introspective authority I seek when converting interpersonal compari­
sons to intrapersonal ones. So whatever the process is called - imagi­
native empathy, extended utility functions, or extended sympathy - it 
fails to successfully bridge the gap in a way that solves the problem of 
interpersonal utility comparisons. 
Many theorists have attempted to solve the problem by using some 
sort of shared index to calibrate people's cardinal preference scales. In 
order to be at all useful, an index of cardinal utilities must be bounded, 
for otherwise the number of preferences above and below any given 
alternative would be infinite, making it impossible to make compari­
sons.152 Thus, a numerical range must bind these preferences. Using 
the example above - with Luke, Emma, and their choices of desserts 
- we make interpersonal comparisons by comparing the following ra­
tios:153 
U (icecream) - min Ue 
maxUe -minUe 
Welfare, in ECONOMICS AND HUMAN WELFARE 183, 186-88 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1979), 
the difference is, I think, irrelevant for our purposes. 
149. See Jon Elster & John E. Roemer, Introduction to INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS 
OF WELL-BEING, supra note 125, at 1, 12. 
150. See id. at 11-12 ("When we think of what it would be like to be handicapped, we 
are almost unavoidably affected by the thought of what it would be like to become handi­
capped."). 
151. See MacKay, supra note 122, at 321-22; see also James Griffin, Against the Taste 
Model, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra note 125, at 45, 52-59. 
152. See Hausman I, supra note 125, at 479. 
153. See id. at 480. 
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U1 (jel/o ) - min U1 
max U1 -min U1 
Where preference satisfaction is the measure of utility, the most 
common way to gauge it is to use the "zero-one rule," assigning a 
value of "O" to the bottoms of everyone's utility functions and "1" to 
the tops (this also makes those equations child's play, since the de­
nominator becomes "1").154 Once one has the "correct" cardinal repre­
sentations of Luke's and Emma's (or anyone's) preferences, then 
those numbers may be used to make interpersonal utility compari­
sons.155 And if one is committed to preference satisfaction as a meas­
ure of well-being, the zero-one rule solves the problem of interper­
sonal comparisons of utilities. 
The zero-one rule, however, has been criticized as both false and 
unfair. Normalizing everyone's top and bottom is false because it ig­
nores the fact that some people may be capable of experiencing 
greater satisfaction, or greater dissatisfaction, than others.156 To use 
Daniel Hausman's example, suppose a scientist placed uncalibrated 
thermometers in different liquids (water, ethanol, benzene, etc.), 
marked the location on the thermometers where each liquid boiled 
and froze, and then normalized those intervals using the zero-one 
rule.157 He would then be able to make claims that, after storing water 
and ethanol in the same room for a long time, the ethanol is higher up 
on its "temperature" scale - "hotter" - than the water.158 Yet the 
ethanol and water are the same temperature. The scientist made an 
154. See id. In the example above, this would make both Luke's and Emma's maxU, = 1 
and their minU, = 0. At that point, if we figured out that, on these scales, Luke's utility from 
jello is .65 and Emma's from ice cream is .75, we should choose ice cream (since .75 is greater 
than .65). 
155. See id. 
156. See GRIFFIN, supra note 127, at 120; WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST 
POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE 
THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 1 11 (1982); Hausman I, supra note 125, at 485. But see Frederic 
Schick, Beyond Utilitarianism, 68 J. PHIL. 657, 665-66 (1971). Schick explains that, even if 
true, different capacities for satisfaction or dissatisfaction should not matter to us: 
Id. 
Some people are said to be capable of greater intensities of feeling than others. The mean­
ing of this is in doubt, and so of course also its truth. But however the claim is understood, I 
do not see why it should concern us. Adam values his summum bonum as highly as he values 
anything, and his summum ma/um is for him the worst of all possibilities. The same is true 
for Eve. When then should Adam's voice on his extrema be given any weight different from 
that given Eve's voice on hers? Suppose that the two did differ in their capacities for inten­
sity, and indeed differed vastly - why should a fanatic count for more than a person with 
tired blood? I see no reason why he should, and so have equalized the limits of the utility 
ranges. 
157. See Hausman I, supra note 125, at 486-87. 
158. See id. 
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error by normalizing the thermometer scales using the zero-one rule.159 
The rule, then, is false with respect to utility comparisons because just 
as different liquids have different boiling and freezing points, "[i)t is 
not the case that we all reach the same peaks and valleys."160 
Although using the zero-one rule to normalize everyone's prefer­
ence structure may seem to culminate in the fair treatment of indi­
viduals, it may actually produce the opposite result. If we use compari­
sons based on the rule to distribute goods, for example, the greedy (or 
more imaginative) will benefit at the expense of the selfless (or less 
imaginative ).161 As Peter Hammond explains: 
Consider some undemanding person who achieves his upper bound at a 
low level of consumption. Do we normalize that person's utility scale so 
that it has the same upper and lower bounds as that of a greedy person? 
If so, and if we distribute goods to each individual so that each achieves, 
say, 90% of maximum utility (which is now a well-defined utility level), 
then the greedy person is likely to be given much more than one feels he 
deserves.162 
John Rawls also notices the potential price exacted by this solution 
to interpersonal comparisons, noting that "the zero-one rule implies 
that, other things equal, greater social utility results from educating 
people to have simple desires and to be easily satisfied . . . .  "163 Thus, a 
preference-satisfaction model of utility and its commitment to the 
zero-one rule may, oddly enough, give rise to unfair distributions of 
goods and perverse social incentives. 
B. Value Judgments in Interpersonal Comparisons 
The alternative to the zero-one rule, of course, is to place every­
one's preferences on some other, less restrictive universal scale, so 
that comparisons may be made between them. That is, instead of nor­
malizing the bottoms and tops of everyone's preference rankings by 
assigning them the same numbers (such as zero and one), we place 
them on a more wide-ranging scale. On this view: 
We are not forced to say that " 'extent to which preferences are satisfied' 
is simply position in a preference ranking". We can say instead that it is a 
measure of the intensity of my preference satisfaction; of how high up on 
159. See id. 
160. GRIFFIN, supra note 127, at 120. 
161. See Hammond, supra note 127, at 216; Hausman I, supra note 125, at 482. 
162. Hammond, supra note 127, at 216. 
163. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 284 (2nd ed. 1999). This problem stems from 
assigning too much weight to aspiration levels, and is related to the "happy slave" phenome­
non in which people adapt to their current circumstances by lowering their expectations (or 
aspirations). See Elster & Roemer, supra note 149, at 6. 
November 2003] The False Promise of One Person, One Vote 245 
the universal scale of preference satisfaction I am . . . .  A person may be 
at the top of his ranking without being at the top of the universal scale.164 
If Luke, for example, has a greater capacity for satisfaction or more 
intense desires than Emma with regard to dessert, his preference for 
jello and ice cream may be represented by, say, 12 and 6 on some uni­
versal scale, while Emma's preferences may be 0.9 and 1.2. It would 
then be clear under many ethical systems that this small society of two 
would be most satisfied by the choice of jello for dessert. This would at 
least solve the apparent falsity of the relatively stifling zero-one rule 
by accounting for the different strengths or intensities of people's 
preferences. 
Once everyone's preferences are placed on the universal scale, we 
could attempt to solve the fairness problems that might be associated 
with distributing scarce goods to those with greater capacities for satis­
faction, and try to ferret out those who misrepresent their preferences 
in order to secure more of a scarce good. We might decide that those 
with greater capacities for satisfaction should get more, or we might 
use notions like "informed preferences"165 or "primary goods"166 to 
achieve an equitable distribution. In any case, once everyone's prefer­
ences are represented on the universal scale, we would have an objec­
tive starting point from which we could make interpersonal compari­
sons and commence the ethical debates about how to distribute goods. 
The problem with this solution is, of course, the one discussed in 
the last several pages: we lack the kind of information that allows us to 
place people's preferences on some objective, universal scale.167 We 
cannot devise a universal scale for ordinal or cardinal utilities because 
we lack the sort of direct access to the minds of others that we would 
need to objectively ground our comparisons. There is no omniscient 
social scientist with the ability to peer into all of our minds, assess our 
preferences, and make comparisons. We seem, therefore, stuck (or, 
back where we started): the zero-one rule is flawed because it assumes 
we all have equal capacities for satisfaction, but we lack the kind of in­
formation to objectively pin down just how to make comparisons be­
tween people. In other words, we face the basic problem with inter­
personal utility comparisons. 
So what does all of this mean? Does it mean that we are not really 
making interpersonal utility comparisons when we think we are? Or 
164. Weintraub, supra note 125, at 662. 
165. John Harsanyi has argued that normative decisions should be based on individuals' 
rational, fully informed preferences. See John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic 
Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309, 311 n.7 (1955). 
166. John Rawls has argued that all citizens of a state should have some basic goods and 
liberties, which he terms "primary goods." See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
(1993); RAWLS, supra note 163. 
167. See, e.g., Hausman II, supra note 125, at 99. 
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that we should not be making such comparisons? Of course not. Peo­
ple obviously make judgments involving interpersonal comparisons all 
the time.168 Parents choosing dessert for their children, for example, do 
their best to compare the strength or intensity of their children's pref­
erences for jello and ice cream. Employers deciding whether to give 
employees a raise or more vacation time assess which option their em­
ployees favor and how strongly they favor it. Governments make 
scores of redistribution decisions based, at least in part, upon assess­
ments of where the distributed goods will bring about the greatest 
utility, or satisfy the most people. 
The important conclusion to be drawn from the problem of inter­
personal utility comparisons, then, is not that one cannot make them, 
but that they are, in a sense, value judgments necessarily involving 
complex normative considerations.169 Even Lionel Robbins, whose 
views on interpersonal comparisons prompted generations of moral 
theorists and economists to avoid such comparisons, did not conclude 
that they are impossible, just that it is silly to think they rest on a "sci­
entific" basis. 170 They cannot be tied down with the kind of neutral, 
value-free empirical evidence that positivist philosophers and econo­
mists desire.171 Once one accepts the fact that we cannot make mean­
ingful interpersonal comparisons in a neutral manner, the problem of 
making them begins to disappear. In a real sense, the desire to avoid 
value judgments is the main problem of interpersonal comparisons.172 
168. Indeed, Amartya Sen, in a decidedly optimistic moment, described the problem of 
making systemic interpersonal comparisons of welfare as "not one of poverty, but of an em­
barrassment of riches." See Sen, supra note 148, at 184. That moment notwithstanding, most 
(or all) of the non-normative interpretations of interpersonal comparisons have been criti­
cized on a number of grounds. 
169. See JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING GOODS: EQUALITY, UNCERTAINTY AND TIME 220 
(1991); GRIFFIN, supra note 127, at 119-20; Hammond, supra note 127, at 226, 236-37; 
Scanlon, supra note 125, at 18, 44. 
170. See ROBBINS, supra note 128, at 140-41.  
171. This is not to say that there are n o  descriptive (that is, non-normative) interpreta­
tions of interpersonal comparisons. There just are not any that are both descriptive and ade­
quate. Sen, for example, catalogues three types of descriptive interpretations: behaviorism, 
introspective welfare comparisons, and introspective as if choice. See Sen, supra note 148, at 
185. The latter two interpretations are versions of the "mental shoehorn maneuver," and 
thus share the problems of that approach, discussed supra text accompanying notes 138-151. 
See Sen, supra note 148, at 186-88. Behaviorism involves using behavior as the basis for 
making comparisons of mental states. Id. But such an interpretation of interpersonal com- · 
parisons depends upon the existence of some agreed-upon criteria linking behavior to men­
tal states, which is something that we do not have, especially when it comes to more complex 
mental states. See id. at 186. Behaviorism may also fail to deal satisfactorily with strategic 
misrepresentations (people play-acting in order to secure more of a scarce good). So while a 
behaviorist approach to interpersonal comparisons is a descriptive one, it, like the many ver­
sions of the mental shoehorn maneuver, may fail to describe adequately the mental states 
that we want to compare. 
172. See Scanlon, supra note 125, at 18. As he further explains: 
In order for a form of interpersonal comparisons to be morally significant, what is compared 
must be related to the good of the individuals in question. But a familiar moral idea of 
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Once we accept this, we can reconcile ourselves to the fact that decid­
ing how much weight to assign to one person's preferences compared 
to another's involves making a fundamental value judgment.173 
The answer to the question whether we should be making such 
comparisons must be an unequivocal "yes." This is so because almost 
all decisions regarding the distribution of goods (including maintaining 
the status quo, for there is no value-free default to fall back upon) in­
volve some interpersonal comparisons. From simple decisions be­
tween two children squabbling over a choice of dessert to more com­
plex ones involving tax-code revisions, we have to figure out how 
much the people involved want something, and then decide how to 
parse it out in a way that maximizes happiness. Thus, despite our best 
attempts, we cannot make the neutral, scientific interpersonal utility 
comparisons that the positivist economists thought necessary to make 
value-free decisions about the distributions of goods. Instead, every 
one of those decisions involves the very type of value judgment that 
they sought so hard to avoid. 
Ill. IMPLICATIONS FOR VOTING RIGHTS 
The problem of interpersonal utility comparisons should directly 
reveal something about the nature of quantitative vote dilution and 
the equiproportional standard used to measure it. Because voting is a 
way to reveal preferences and counting votes is a procedure to aggre­
gate those preferences, assigning numerical weights to votes necessar­
ily means making some judgment as to the proper weight assigned to 
each voter's preferences. And that, of course, means we have made an 
interpersonal utility comparison. 
This relationship between interpersonal utility comparisons and 
quantitative vote dilution tells us several things about the nature of the 
equiproportional standard, and I deal with each in turn. First, the rela­
tionship confirms that there is nothing objective or neutral about the 
standard. Second, it explains our collective attraction to the standard 
Neutrality seems to demand that the interpersonal comparisons we make in ethics not be 
based on our own judgments about what makes a life better for the person who lives it, all 
such judgments being deferred instead to the preferences of the individuals whose lives are 
being compared. The clash between these two moral ideas leads to an impasse. 
Id. at 44. 
173. The process of moving from normative judgment to interpersonal comparison, of 
course, works both ways. As John Broome explains: 
It is not as though, when we make ethical comparisons of distributions across people, the 
betterness ordering of the distributions must be given in advance, so that we simply find out 
from this ordering the quantitative scales of good for individuals. To some extent we may al­
ready have an idea of how one person's good compares with another's, which we can use to 
form judgements about the goodness of alternative distributions, and to some extent we may 
already have an idea of what distributions are better than others. 
BROOME, supra note 169, at 220. 
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and, somewhat paradoxically, our acceptance of certain constitutional 
exceptions to it. In this vein, it also allows us to connect the concept of 
quantitative vote dilution to the other two aspects of voting rights -
the right to exercise the franchise and the right to do so in a way free 
from qualitative dilution. Third, recasting the equiproportional stan­
dard in terms of making interpersonal utility comparisons gives rise to 
some normative suggestions for restructuring the law governing voting 
rights. 
A. Why There Is Nothing Objective About One Person, One Vote 
The issues surrounding interpersonal utility comparisons make 
clear that there is nothing neutral or objective about a decision to as­
sign equal numerical weight to each vote.174 To be objective, a quanti­
tative vote dilution standard would need to be tied in some transpar­
ent way to the most relevant external object - here the relative 
strengths of the preferences that an election is intended to reveal and 
aggregate. The neutral way to connect the two together would be to 
calibrate the weight of every person's vote with the strength of her 
preference: those who care the most about the outcome of an election 
receive the highest-weighted votes, those who least care about the 
outcome get the lowest-weighted votes, and those somewhere in be­
tween receive something in between. In such a system, the vote dilu­
tion standard is that each person's vote is given a weight that matches 
the strength of her preference; as more or less weight is assigned 
to her vote, it concentrates or dilutes her voting power. In this 
world, each individual would g�t to have her say in as many different 
elections as she cared to, in exact proportion to the strength of her 
preferences.175 
In discussing the assignment of weights to votes based on prefer­
ence strength, I am making what is mainly a descriptive point. Even 
with perfect information about everyone's preferences and a method 
to make comparisons between them, there may be many reasons why 
we would not want to tie the weight of someone's vote to the strength 
of her interest in an election. Some (members of some minority 
groups, for example) may not care that much about the outcome of 
elections because they have effectively been shut out of the political 
system for so long. In essence, they have been trained to want and ex­
pect less. Their resulting political indifference should not doom them 
174. The basic point that the equiproportional standard involves some sort of normative 
judgment is not new. See, e.g., HASEN, supra note 32, at 4-6. But I think the more specific 
point of why, exactly, it does so is new and helps fill in Rick Hasen's list of why process the­
ory fails to provide an adequate foundation for the standard. See id. 
175. Of course, other forms of political activity besides voting, such as running for office 
or making campaign contributions, may involve more calibrated expressions of utility, but 
they are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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to a lightly weighed vote. Some (young children, the insane) may have 
skewed ideas about what is good for them - so skewed that we make 
a collective decision to override their particular preferences and do 
what we think is in their best interest. That is, regardless of the 
strength of their preferences, we think the content should not be re­
flected in political outcomes. And awarding votes or voting weight 
based on strength of preference is also a good way to reward hotheads 
or those easily dissatisfied, since both groups always feel more strongly 
about the outcome of an election than those with a little more toler­
ance. In other words, there are many reasons why strictly tying voting 
weight to preference strength may be a very bad idea. 
That said, there is a great deal of evidence that we do in fact cor­
relate the right to vote and the right to have one's vote accorded a cer­
tain weight to the strength of one's preferences.176 When it comes to 
the right to cast a ballot, controversy often revolves around which 
people have sufficient interest in the outcome of an election to allow 
them to vote.177 That is, both sides in a debate over the extension of 
the franchise often point to the strength of a person's interest in the 
election, and the corresponding strength of their preferences regarding 
its outcome. This is true of many franchise restrictions, from the early 
property-holding requirements to the modern-day residency require­
ments.178 And it is true of some of the exceptions to the one person, 
one vote requirement carved out by the Supreme Court.179 Thus, as­
signing voting strength in proportion to preference strength is some­
thing that is, in effect, built into many aspects of our democracy. 
Although we can be pretty certain that people care about elections 
to differing degrees, we lack a foolproof way of figuring out how much 
they care, and, therefore, we are unable to make comparisons between 
them.180 There is no objective way to devise a standard of quantitative 
vote dilution that ties the weight of each person's vote to the intensity 
of her preferences. Importantly, this conclusion about the lack of an 
objective standard applies both to standards that assign votes different 
numerical weights and to standards that assign them the same weight. 
176. I tend to think we do this mainly for reasons of efficiency, not justice. That is, we do 
it because we think people will make better decisions when they have something at stake in 
the outcome of an election. 
177. For a more thorough discussion of this point, see infra Part III.B.2. 
178. See infra Part III.B.2. 
179. See infra Part III.B.1-2. 
180. This was the whole point of Part II. 
We would, of course, have to make all sorts of other decisions regarding the allocation of 
voting power in such a system. We would have to worry about the fact that such a system 
would give people with a greater capacity for satisfaction more political power than the eas­
ily satisfied. We would also have to worry about people strategically misrepresenting the 
strength of their preferences in order to gamer more political power. But all of these consid­
erations do not make the equiproportional standard any more objective. 
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That is, the equiproportional standard is only objective in this sense if 
people have identically strong (or weak) preferences about the out­
come of an election - and we cannot know that any more than we 
know the exact degree to which their preferences vary. Weighting 
votes equally, then, is no more objective than weighting them une­
qually and, indeed, we may very well have good reason for thinking 
votes should be given different weights because people care about 
elections to different degrees. 
But what if, as discussed above, the relevant object is not the 
strength of people's preferences but something else, like something 
fundamental to the concept of democracy? Don't basic notions of 
democratic fairness demand that each person's preferences, regardless 
of how strongly held, be given the same amount of weight? Doesn't 
the one person, one vote standard merely replicate a basic decision 
about political equality that we have already made in countless other 
areas? 
Well, in a word, no - at least not in our democratic system.181 We 
do not pretend to assign every person's preferences exactly the same 
weight in any of our democratic institutions. This is true of, among 
others, the U.S. Presidency, the U.S. Senate, and the federal and state 
judicial systems. It is also true of institutions subject to the equipro­
portional standard, such as Congress and state legislatures, for most 
people are prevented from voting in most elections (because of resi­
dency requirements, for example) and some are prevented from 
voting in any election (because of rather ubiquitous citizenship re­
quirements, for example). And, of course, arguments that such institu­
tions are actually undemocratic precisely because they do not adhere 
to the one person, one vote principle involve question-begging of the 
worst sort. 
Thus, the first thing the problem of interpersonal utility compari­
sons reveals about the one person, one vote standard is that Justice 
Frankfurter was right: there is nothing in our conception of democracy 
that requires the standard. Instead, it is a normative choice among 
many "competing bases of representation."182 Just as philosophers and 
economists failed in their search for an objective, value-free way to 
make interpersonal comparisons of people's preference satisfaction, 
political theorists must fail in their search for a standard way of aggre­
gating those preferences into a social choice. The early reapportion­
ment cases did not involve the judiciary in subjective political deci­
sions just because they inevitably entangled it in the qualitative vote 
dilution cases (although that did happen). Instead, they did so quite 
181. See DAHL, supra note 91 . 
182. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also 
Charles, supra note 85, at 1126-29 (discussing the roots of Justice Frankfurter's objections to 
Baker). 
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directly, by deciding upon a certain correct weighting of votes without 
reference to the strength of the preferences that those votes revealed. 
At that point, whether they knew it or not, the Justices were already 
pretty deep into the political thicket. 
B. Toward a Unified Theory of Voting Rights 
1. Why We Use the One Person, One Vote Standard 
So why do we continue to apply the equiproportional standard to 
some of our most important governmental institutions? The answer is, 
I think, somewhat counterintuitive: we use the one person, one vote 
standard in order to avoid making interpersonal comparisons of util­
ity. This reason helps explain both the exceptions to the standard and 
the relationship between quantitative vote dilution and access to the 
ballot box. 
Viewing the equiproportional standard as the result of an unwill­
ingness to evaluate the strength of personal preferences is counterin­
tuitive because the standard appears to embody a positive judgment of 
political equality, not a negative judgment of futility or avoidance. 
That is, it is a judgment that everyone has about the same level of in­
terest in the outcome of an election so they should all have their pref­
erences assigned equal weight. Few would argue that we all actually 
have the perfectly equal interests in the outcome of an election that 
would justify the slavish adherence to the standard demanded by the 
Supreme Court for congressional districts. Nonetheless, there may be 
a positive judgment that, in congressional or state-legislative elections, 
the interests of those within the country or state are more or less the 
same, and the interests of those outside the state are significantly 
lower (close to zero, given that they do not have the opportunity to 
vote). 
But does anyone really believe that everyone within a particular 
district has about the same interest in an election, or is it that we just 
lack the kind of information needed to make a more fine-tuned as­
sessment of each person's preferences? I tend to think that it is the lat­
ter. If, for example, I live in Connecticut, work in New York, vacation 
every summer in my second house in Vermont, and have an ailing 
mother in Kansas, and you live in, work in, and never want to leave 
Connecticut, it would be ridiculous to describe the strength of our re­
spective interests in the elections of Connecticut, New York, Vermont, 
and Kansas as (1, 0, 0, 0) and (1,  0, 0, 0). But it would also be perfectly 
reasonable to say that we could never come close to having the kind of 
detailed information about the strength of every person's interest in 
every possible election to allow us to assign and weight votes more 
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precisely.183 Which is why I think use of the equiproportional standard 
involves a negative judgment, a default that we apply in the many 
cases in which we lack the kind of detailed information needed to tie 
the weight of one's vote to the intensity of his preferences more pre­
cisely. 
The Supreme Court's failure to adopt a consistent notion of equal­
ity in the more straightforward quantitative vote dilution cases betrays 
its reluctance to make substantive judgments without more detailed 
information about the strength of voter interest. As Heather Gerken 
has explained,  the Court's failure appears to stem from discomfort 
with the structural or group-based aspects of the one person, one vote 
claims. 184 A discomfort with group-based claims is a discomfort with 
making what are obviously substantive political choices - choosing 
winners and losers in the democratic arena. Thus, when contemplating 
this facet of the quantitative dilution claims, the Court feels ill­
equipped, for whatever reason, to make the substantive political deci­
sions these cases demand. But, of course, the one person, one vote 
standard is itself a substantive political decision, so the Court has at 
best fooled itself into thinking that it has extricated the judiciary from 
making political choices. 
This conclusion is also confirmed by and helps explain some of the 
exceptions to the one person, one vote standard, and, more broadly, 
accounts for the link between quantitative vote dilution and access to 
the ballot box. When we do have (or think we have) more detailed in­
formation about the strength of voter preferences, we allow excep­
tions to the one person, one vote standard. (Indeed, as discussed be­
low, we even allow states to withhold the franchise completely.) In 
such situations, states will often establish a method of weighting votes 
that corresponds to some proxy for strength of voter interest.185 
The exemption given to special-purpose districts is a good example 
of this principle. The one person, one vote standard applies to only 
those local governmental units186 that exercise "general governmental 
powers," including carrying out the common functions of a municipal 
183. Along these lines, Gerald Frug has suggested a plan where everyone receives five 
votes that they may cast in whatever local elections they feel affect their interests. See 
GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNmES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 
106-07 ( 1999). Allowing voters to define their own interests would surmount some of the 
hurdles in coming up with detailed information on voter preferences. 
184. See Gerken, supra note 88, at 1457-66. 
185 . Of course, the dominant rule in corporate governance is the one share, one vote 
principle, which allows shareholders to cast votes weighted in proportion to their financial 
stake in the corporation. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model 
of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1945 ( 1996). 
186. See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (applying the equipropor­
tional standard to a junior college district); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) 
(applying the equiproportional standard to a county). 
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government.187 We would expect such a governmental body to affect 
all within its power to more or less the same degree, and would there­
fore expect people to have more or less the same strength of prefer­
ences as to the representatives on that body. It would make sense, 
then, to apply the equiproportional standard in these districts (if any­
where). In A very v. Midland County, however, the Supreme Court re­
served the issue of whether the equiproportional standard applied to 
local governmental units that did not affect all within their power to 
the same degree, stating: 
Were the Commissioners Court a special-purpose unit of government as­
signed the performance of functions affecting definable groups of con­
stituents more than other constituents, we would have to confront 
the question whether such a body may be apportioned in ways which 
give greater influence to the citizens most affected by the organization's 
functions.188 
The Court would soon confront the status of these "special-purpose 
districts" in a case involving California's Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Storage District.189 
The Tulare Lake water district covered 193,000 acres of farmland 
inhabited by seventy-seven people, most of whom were employees of 
one of four large corporations that farmed land in the district.190 The 
district was in charge of the acquisition, storage, conservation, and dis­
tribution of water.191 To that end, it had the power to acquire and im­
prove property, generate and distribute hydroelectric power, charge 
for water, and assess costs associated with these activities in accor­
dance with the benefits accruing to each tract of land.192 An elected 
187. See, e.g., Hadley, 397 U.S. at 54; Avery, 390 U.S. at 484-85; see also New York City 
Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 694-96 (1989). Morris provides a good example of a 
governmental entity that exercises general governmental powers: 
Id. 
New York law assigns to the board a significant range of functions common to municipal 
governments. Fiscal responsibilities include calculating sewer and water rates, tax abate­
ments, and property taxes on urban development projects. The board manages all city prop­
erty; exercises plenary zoning authority; dispenses all franchises and leases on city property; 
fixes generally the salaries of all officers and persons compensated through city moneys; and 
grants all city contracts . . . .  
In addition, and of inajor significance, the board shares legislative functions with the city 
council with respect to modifying and approving the city's capital and expense budgets. The 
mayor submits a proposed city budget to the board and city council, but does not participate 
in board decisions to adopt or alter the proposal. Approval or modification of the proposed 
budget requires agreement between the board and the city council. 
188. Avery, 390 U.S. at 483-84. 
189. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). 
Nearly a decade later, the Court confronted another water district and reached a similar re­
sult. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981). 
190. Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 723. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 723-24. 
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board of directors governed the water district. The elections, however, 
were limited in that only landowners could vote, and their votes were 
apportioned according to the assessed valuation of the land they 
owned (sort of a one acre, one vote system).193 As a result, one corpo­
rate landowner had 37,825 votes, while other, smaller landowners had 
only one vote.194 The latter brought suit alleging that the voting 
scheme violated the one person, one vote requirement of the Equal 
Protection Clause.195 
The Supreme Court disagreed. In doing so, the Court carved out 
the "special-purpose district" exception to the one person, one vote 
requirement,196 and further found that the proportionate voting 
scheme used in its place had a rational basis.197 This was so, the Court 
reasoned, because the board's powers were limited such that its ac­
tions disproportionately affected landowners (as opposed to mere 
residents),198 and that benefits and burdens fell on landowners in pro­
portion to the amount of land they owned.199 Landowners have a 
greater interest in, and care more about, the storage and distribution 
of water in the Tulare Lake water district, and the strength of their in­
terest roughly corresponds to the amount of land that they own. 
This case, therefore, is an example of one in which we think we 
have some information about the relative strength of people's prefer­
ences, and can make the kind of interpersonal utility comparisons that 
allow us to deviate from the one person, one vote principle.200 Even 
Justice Douglas, writing in dissent, did not really disagree with the 
fundamental notion that there may be times when an exception of this 
193. Id. at 724-25. 
194. Id. at 733. 
195. See id. at 724-27. The plaintiffs also contended that the scheme, by requiring voters 
. to own land, resulted in a denial of their equal protection rights. Id. at 730. 
196. Id. at 730. 
197. Id. at 734. 
198. Id. at 729. 
199. Id. at 734. 
200. This reasoning has been applied in many cases where the actions of a local govern­
mental entity disproportionately affect people. See, e.g., Porterfield v. Van Boening, 744 P.2d 
468 (Ariz. 1987) (irrigation district); Arizona Farmworkers Union v. Agric. Employment 
Relations Bd., 712 P.2d 960 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (union-representation district); Schindler 
v. Palo Verde Irrigation Dist., 82 Cal. Rptr. 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (irrigation district); 
Thompson v. Bd. of Directors, 55 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (irrigation district); 
Chesser v. Buchanan, 568 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1977) (tunnel-improvement district); Stelzel v. S. 
Indian River Water Control Dist., 486 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1986) (water-control district); State v. 
Frontier Acres Cmty. Dev. Dist., 472 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1985) (community-development dis­
trict); Lake Howell Water & Reclamation Dist. v. State, 268 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1972) (drainage 
district); Goldstein v. Mitchell, 494 N.E.2d 914 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (drainage district). 
Sanford Levinson muses about a few other possibilities in this regard, such as giving law­
yers an extra vote in judicial elections because of their special knowledge of and interest in 
such elections. See Levinson, supra note 88, at 1276-77. 
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kind is appropriate;201 instead, he just believed that this was not one of 
those times. In his opinion, the board took actions that affected all 
within the district (such as managing flood control), and so everyone 
had an interest in the elections.202 But all members of the Court shared 
the notion that the strength of one's interest in an election bears some 
relationship to the weight assigned to one's vote. 
The special-purpose-district cases show us two things. First, they 
show that the Court is willing to allow states to parse out votes in rela­
tionship to the strength of a voter's interest in the outcome of the elec­
tion. This tells us that in some fairly extreme cases, when we think we 
have enough information about voter preferences to make interper­
sonal comparisons of utility, we allow certain tailored exceptions to 
the one person, one vote standard. Second, the special-purpose-district 
cases show that the Court will allow a state to - right off the top -
restrict voting eligibility to one particular class of people (in this case, 
landowners ).203 This is something that may be quite obvious, but brings 
us to the second point of this Part: that in addition to explaining some 
of the exceptions to the equiproportional standard, the problem of in­
terpersonal utility comparisons.helps explain the reasoning behind re­
stricting the franchise outright, and thus the relationship between the 
right to cast a ballot and the right to cast an equally weighted ballot. 
2. Quantitative Vote Dilution and Access 
That the right to cast a ballot and the right to cast an equally 
weighted ballot are somehow connected should not be surprising. The 
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, in oft-quoted language, noted that 
"the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the 
weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting 
the free exercise of the franchise. "204 Practically speaking, numerically 
diluting a vote can, in extreme cases, have the same effect as denying 
the right to vote altogether, and thus our · voting rights laws protect 
against both. But interpersonal utility comparisons tell us that the two 
types of voting rights are not only related because of a similar effect; 
they are also, to some extent, produced by the same cause. 
The special-purpose-district cases show that we allow states to vary 
the numerical power of one's vote when we think we have good in­
formation about the varying degrees of interest that people have in the 
201. Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 736-37 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
202. Id. at 737-38 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
203. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 370-71 (1981); Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 726-30. 
204. 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964); see Emily M. Calhoun, The First Amendment and Dis­
tributional Voting Rights Controversies, 52 TENN. L. REV. 549, 550 (1985) (describing both 
the relative weight given to votes and the exclusion of some persons from the franchise as 
"distributional" issues). 
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outcome of the election. At some point, however, we make a judg­
ment that certain people have so little interest in an election that they 
should not vote at all. While there is always disagreement about which 
people have an interest sufficient to allow them to vote, the two sides 
of any such debate seem to acknowledge the underlying principle that 
we can make the decision based, at least in part, on the strength of the 
person's interest in the election, and the corresponding strength of 
their preferences about its outcome.205 Historical and contemporary 
examples help illustrate this point. 
At this country's founding, many states limited suffrage to white 
men who owned a certain amount of property.206 One of the principal 
justifications for these freehold requirements was the idea that those 
who possessed real property "had a unique 'stake in · society' -
meaning that they were committed members of (or shareholders in) 
the community and that they had a personal interest in the policies of 
the state, especially taxation."207 In the early nineteenth century, when 
states replaced property requirements with taxpaying requirements, 
they, too, were justified by arguments that only those with a stake in 
the community should be able to vote,208 and that only those who 
share the burdens of government should have a voice in it.209 (In other 
words, "no representation without taxation.") Both of these early eco­
nomic restraints on the franchise, then, were justified by the argument 
that the right to vote should only be extended to those most affected 
by and interested in the business of government. 
One contemporary set of restraints on the exercise of the franchise 
- so widespread that they are rarely analyzed as such - are residency 
requirements.210 These, too, are justified by the assumption that only 
those who live within the territory under the control of a governmen-
205. See Melvyn R Durchslag, Salyer, Ball, and Holt· Reappraising the Right to Vote in 
Terms of Political "Interest" and Vote Dilution, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1982) 
(discussing the fact that " 'interest,' implicitly or explicitly, must be the touchstone of the 
Court's analysis" of several types of voting rights cases). 
206. For a list of the property and taxpaying requirements in the colonies and states be­
tween 1776 and 1855, see KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at app. tbls.1-3. 
207. Id. at 5; see also Glenn P. Smith, Note, Interest Exceptions to One-Resident, One-
Vote: Better Results from the Voting Rights Act?, 74 TEXAS L. REV. 1153 (1996). 
208. See KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 131. 
209. See id. at 50. 
210. Mere residency requirements, sometimes called bona fide residency requirements, 
are not to be confused with durational residency requirements. Durational residency re­
quirements, which require an extended period of residency before one becomes eligible to 
vote, were often instituted to diminish the political power of certain, more itinerant groups. 
See KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 146-51 .  The Court later declared such requirements unconsti­
tutional unless "necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest," Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972) (emphasis and citations omitted), although it did allow 
states to require voters to register thirty days in advance of an election, id. at 347. 
November 2003] The False Promise of One Person, One Vote 257 
tal body have enough of a stake in the government to vote.211 Indeed, 
residency requirements, like the equiproportional standard, some­
times find justification in the fact that they are easily managed.212 In 
other words, it is too difficult to figure out which nonresidents have a 
sufficient stake in an election, so we use a residency default as a proxy 
for such an interest.213 While academics and litigants have challenged 
such requirements, they usually leave the assumption untouched. 
Again, the quibble is that residency, or lack of it, does not serve as a 
very accurate proxy for the strength of one's preferences in the out­
come of an election.214 Those who live in one city or state and work in 
another argue that they have enough at stake in their workplace that 
they should be allowed to vote in its jurisdiction, and those who own 
vacation homes argue that they too are sufficiently interested in the 
jurisdictions where their homes are located. All seem to agree that the 
key to the right to vote is having a sufficient interest in the outcome of 
the election. And, just as it is with the exceptions to the equipropor­
tional standard, the common root of such arguments is that we 
can make the kind of interpersonal utility comparisons that would al­
low us to make informed judgments about different people's levels of 
interest, and thus their rights to vote or their rights to an equally 
weighted vote. 
The Supreme Court was most explicit about the constitutional 
status of interest-based exclusions from the franchise in Kramer v. 
211. See Smith, supra note 207, at 1159 (explaining that, in the 1960s, residency became 
"the sole proxy for electoral interest. Residency - and, in most cases, residency alone -
became the standard for granting suffrage to qualified potential voters."). This is not to im­
ply that such a justification is the only justification for residency requirements. They were 
also imposed in order to limit the voting power of recent immigrants, KEYSSAR, supra note 
8, at 147-51, and to prevent fraud by those who would temporarily move a large group of 
people into a jurisdiction in order to win an election, id. at 148. 
212. See, e.g., Kollar v. City of Tucson, 319 F. Supp. 482 (D. Ariz. 1970) (finding an 
Arizona law limiting voting in municipal water-bond elections to municipal residents to be 
constitutional despite the fact that nonresidents may have had a pecuniary interest in the 
elections). 
213. See id. at 485 ("To allow the municipal franchise to [extend to] all persons with a 
pecuniary interest would not permit of a manageable standard or adequately define a cohe­
sive interest group of electors."). 
214. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69 (1978) ("The imaginary 
line defining a city's corporate limits cannot corral the influence of municipal actions. A 
city's decisions inescapably affect individuals living immediately outside its borders."); 
Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1 115, 1 132 (1996) ("Boundaries exclude people who may be interested in or 
affected by the decisions made within the boundaries."). 
For this reason and others, some scholars have suggested decoupling voting from resi­
dency. See Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders: A Partial Response to Richard 
Briffault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1 187-89 (1996); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries 
of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1909 (1994); Jerry 
Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 324-25 (1993). For a critique, see 
Briffault, supra, at 1158-62. 
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Union Free School District.215 Kramer involved a challenge to a voter­
qualification statute for school-district elections that limited the fran­
chise to people who either (a) owned or leased taxable real property 
within the district, or (b) had children enrolled in the district's 
schools.216 While the Court rendered the statute unconstitutional be­
cause the restrictions were not narrowly tailored (they included some 
uninterested people and excluded some interested ones ),217 the Court 
assumed that a state may limit the franchise to the portion of the elec­
torate 'primarily affected' by the outcome of an election if it demon­
strates that "all those excluded are in fact substantially less interested 
or affected than those the [franchise] includes."218 Thus, the Court did 
not question the assumption that people might be classified into two 
groups - voters and nonvoters - based upon the level of their inter­
est in the election.219 And, as discussed above, the Court allowed just 
such a classification in the case of special-purpose districts. 
Of course, governmental restrictions on the franchise are not the 
only way to calibrate voter participation with voter interest. Eligible 
voters may (and undoubtedly often do) decide on their own that a par­
ticular election does not merit the time or energy required to actually 
215. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
216. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 622. 
217. See id. at 632. As an example, the Court explained: 
[A ]ppellant resides with his parents in the school district, pays state and federal taxes and is 
jnterested in and affected by school board decisions; however, he has no vote. On the other 
hand, an uninterested unemployed young man who pays no state or federal truces, but who 
rents an apartment in the district, can participate in the election. 
Id. at 632 n.15. 
218. See id. at 632. Rick Hasen, among others, argues that the Court used a "judicial 
sleight-of-hand" in moving from the state's argument with respect to a voter's objective in­
terest in an election to the plaintiff's subjective interests in an election in deciding that the 
law was not narrowly tailored enough to pass constitutional scrutiny. See HASEN, supra note 
32, at 63-64; see also Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Lo­
cal Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 354-56 (1993). While this may be true, I do not 
think the distinction between objective and subjective interests ultimately has any bearing on 
this issue here. If anything, it supports the argument that the Court, despite its concern with 
the level of voter interest, finds making such individualized assessments to be practically im­
possible. 
219. In a similar vein, with respect to the poll tax successfully challenged in Harper v. 
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), John Hart Ely explained that, despite the fact 
that the Court found the tax to be irrational, "[i)t may also be true, or at least it is not irra­
tional to think so, that persons of some wealth tend to be more 'responsible' citizens or, 
more plausibly still, that willingness to pay a fee for voting is some reflection of serious in­
terest in the election." ELY, supra note 50, at 120. Other contemporary restrictions on the 
franchise, such as citizenship requirements, have also been subject to this type of interest 
analysis. See, e.g., Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitu­
tional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1441-45 (1993) 
(listing the "classical democratic" arguments for alien suffrage). 
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vote.220 Without delving into the voluminous literature on voter turn­
out,221 it suffices for these purposes to say that at least one of the rea­
sons people do not vote is that they do not care enough about the out­
come of the election. But like governmental restrictions on the right to 
vote, individual decisions to vote only crudely reflect preference 
strength - people's interest in the election either reaches a particular 
threshold point at which they vote, or it does not. There is no way to 
weight a vote in a way that might reflect preference strength in a more 
nuanced way. But, like outright denials of the franchise, the issue of 
voter turnout may be amenable to this kind of analysis. 
· 3. Quantitative and Qualitative Vote Dilution 
Analyzing the equiproportional standard as an exercise in making 
interpersonal utility comparisons may also tell us that quantitative and 
qualitative vote dilution are, at some core level, the same thing.222 This 
is true for a couple of reasons. 
First, because it is impossible to make objective interpersonal 
comparisons, quantitative vote dilution standards - whether equipro­
portional or, in a more obvious case, interest-based standards some­
times used in special-purpose districts - stand on judgments every bit 
as subjective as those used in qualitative vote dilution decisions.223 This 
both confirms and strengthens the argument for what some commen­
tators have been saying for a long time: that the right to a numerically 
undiluted vote, like the right to a qualitatively undiluted vote, is best 
viewed as a group right.224 In both cases, we must make a normative 
220. Voluntary decisions not to vote seem different than mandatory restrictions on the 
franchise, but, either way, if the person does not vote, her preferences are not reflected in 
the social choice, and there is a relationship between interest and the lack of a vote. 
221. See generally FRANCES Fox PIVENS & RICHARD CLOW ARD, WHY AMERICANS 
DON'T VOTE (1989) (discussing various theories for low voter turnout). 
222. Barbara Phillips makes a similar point, but the basis for her claim is, I think, some­
what thinner. She notes: 
Ultimately, it becomes apparent that all vote dilution claims allege injury of essentially the 
same character. Therefore, it is inappropriate for the Court to apply differing standards to 
dilution claims depending upon the descriptive nature of the challenged aggregation prac­
tice. That the aggregation's deficiency can be attributed to a group characteristic of location, 
race, language, or political affiliation should be irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry. 
Phillips, supra note 118, at 583. But it appears that the only common point for her is that all 
types of dilution claims affect the ability to aggregate votes. That, I think, is true (and is also 
true of the access cases - since if you cannot vote, you cannot aggregate your vote with 
those of other like-minded people), but incomplete - for if this is the only connection, it is 
still quite possible that different sorts of dilution affect a group's ability to aggregate votes in 
different ways, and thus may require different standards and solutions. 
223. See supra Part III.A 
224. See, e.g., GUINIER, supra note 2, at 124-25; Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, 
Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111  HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2282 n.30 
(1998); Karlan, The Rights To Vote, supra note 114, at 1717-18. 
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judgment about which groups of people we will allow to aggregate 
votes to elect someone to represent their interests. The seductive ap­
peal of the one person, one vote standard has led us to believe that it 
is somehow based on an individual right and is therefore more neutral 
or objective. It is not. 
Second, and more importantly, the two types of vote dilution may 
also be related because membership in a particular group, in addition 
to telling us something about the content of an individual's prefer­
ences, tells us something about the strength of those preferences. On a 
general level, we may describe membership in a political community in 
terms of shared interest in the outcome of an election. That is, the fact 
that a particular group of people will experience the impact of a given 
election more acutely than others helps to define the group.225 All of 
those living in an agricultural valley may have a particular interest in 
water-distribution issues. They may disagree among themselves, but 
they all have relatively strong interests at stake in - and therefore 
intense preferences about - a water-board election. Those living in 
the South may have a strong interest in civil-rights issues. Again, 
whites and blacks in the South may generally be on opposite sides of 
such issues, but they all feel strongly about them. 
Moreover, within these groups, there are subgroups {farmers or 
homeowners, whites or blacks) that not only have strong interests in 
an election, but also share an opinion as to the preferred outcome.226 
Members of such groups are likely to have particularly strong prefer­
ences, both because people with strong preferences are initially more 
likely to identify as part of a group that shares their political objectives 
and because membership subsequently reinforces the nature and 
strength of those preferences. {This may also wash out the typical dis­
tinction drawn between individual and group rights. People are placed 
in groups for the purposes of voting based in part on real or perceived 
individual interest, and that membership in the group, in turn, forms 
and informs individual interest.) 
The fact that certain groups share preferences with similar content 
and of similar strength provides this second connection between quali­
tative and quantitative vote dilution. Qualitative vote dilution, as dis­
cussed above, occurs when people are unable to combine their votes 
with those of other like-minded people in a way that allows them to 
have a chance of electing a candidate of their choice.227 The presence 
of a group of like-minded people, then, is a necessary prerequisite to 
any claim of qualitative dilution. It is for this reason that one must 
prove membership in a group that is "politically cohesive" in order to 
225. See Calhoun, supra note 204, at 579-80. 
226. Id. at 579-80 & n.150. 
227. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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bring a claim under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.228 But because 
membership in a politically cohesive group may tell us something 
about the strength of a person's preferences, we may use it to calibrate 
the numerical weight of that person's (or group's) vote as well. The 
fact that a group has a potential qualitative vote dilution claim may 
tell us that it is also a group whose votes should receive more weight.229 
The remedy, then, may be both to redraw district lines to provide 
more majority-minority districts and to reduce the size of those dis­
tricts to concentrate the vote numerically.230 And all of this comes 
about because the relationship between group membership and pref­
erence strength provides the link between the concepts of qualitative 
and quantitative vote dilution 
4. Some Implications for Voting Rights Law 
The insights gleaned from viewing voting rights as a function of in­
terpersonal utility comparisons may help reframe some of the theo­
retical problems associated with voting rights. It makes clear that a 
districting decision based on the one person, one vote standard is no 
less subjective than a decision about who gets to vote and about how, 
exactly, district lines are drawn. It also ties the three types of voting 
rights together at some fundamental level. The ultimate issue, though, 
will be what all of this means for the legal status of the various types 
of voting rights. And though the full implications are beyond the scope 
of this Article, I do wish to offer some preliminary thoughts on the 
subject.231 
The first and most obvious implication is that, to the extent that 
the quantitative vote dilution cases receive special legal treatment as a 
result of the fact that the one person, one vote standard is a more 
"objective" basis for judicial decisionmaking, we need to either justify 
that treatment on some other basis or eliminate it. Quantitative vote 
228. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). This is discussed in greater 
detail infra Part IIl.B.4. 
229. This argument, one might suppose, could also militate in favor of numerically con­
centrating the voting power of white voters in a typical qualitative vote dilution case, be­
cause such cases require the presence of both minority and majority racial bloc voting. See 
id. But there are at least two preliminary answers to this possible implication. First, there is 
usually a much higher degree of bloc voting among minority groups than among majority 
groups in the typical vote dilution case (in other words, there are usually more white cross­
over voters than black or Hispanic crossover voters). Second, nothing in my argument pre­
vents one from making a further normative decision to numerically concentrate the votes of 
one group over another group with equally strong preferences. Indeed, the argument is that 
all of these decisions involve substantive political choices. 
230. This is discussed more fully infra Part IIl.B.4. 
231. For more extended thoughts on the subject, see Grant M. Hayden, Beyond One 
Person, One Vote: Resolving the Dilemma of Minority Representation, 92 CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming Dec. 2004). 
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dilution claims involving state legislative districts are typically brought 
under the Equal Protection Clause, but, unlike other such claims, they 
do not require proof of discriminatory intent.232 That, coupled with the 
Court's low tolerance for population deviation, means that the mo­
ment the census figures are released, almost every existing districting 
plan is unconstitutional.233 This, in tum, licenses "a race to the court­
house" by plaintiffs who, while perhaps not overly concerned with the 
numerical disparities, see them as an opportunity to present remedial 
plans that favor their particular interest.234 
These doctrinal and temporal privileges afforded to the one per­
son, one vote claims appear to find roots in the objective nature of the 
standard; districts with different populations are so obviously wrong 
that they need to be remedied without regard to intent or any other 
evidence that they substantively affect a particular group's vote. While 
I do not think the Court should require proof of discriminatory intent 
(or, at least, what the Court considers adequate proof of such intent) 
in any equal protection claims, the point here is that, either way, it 
should not treat the one person, one vote cases more leniently. An in­
tent requirement, coupled with a relaxation of the Court's strict nu­
merical rules regarding apportionment bases, would go a long way in 
this direction. 
A second set of suggestions for legal reform comes from the rela­
tionship between quantitative vote dilution and access to the polls. 
Currently, one either has the right to vote or not, and one is either 
counted in the apportionment base or not. But if both access to the 
polls and quantitative voting power are a function of preference 
strength, we should, in some cases, be able to do better. That is, if pos­
sible - because we have sufficiently detailed preference information 
- and when appropriate, we should be able to tailor voting power to 
certain groups. 
One example of this involves resident aliens.235 Resident aliens 
have vital political, economic, and social interests in the towns, states, 
and country in which they live.236 They thus have much at stake in 
most elections, and we would reasonably expect them to have prefer-
232. See, e.g., Tucker v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 958 F.2d 1411, 1414-15 (7th 
Cir. 1992). Claims involving congressional districts are brought under Article I, section 2 of 
the Constitution, and also do not require a showing of discriminatory intent. 
233. See Karlan, The Rights To Vote, supra note 114, at 1726. 
234. Id. at 1726-29. 
235. Other, less controversial examples may include assigning partial voting power to 
students or other people who might qualify as residents in more than one place. See Ashira 
Pelman Ostrow, Dual Resident Voting: Traditional Disenfranchisement and Prospects for 
Change, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1954 (2002) (arguing that dual residents should be enfran­
chised at the local level). 
236. For a good discussion of these interests, and judicial commentary on them, see 
Raskin, supra note 219, at 1441-45. 
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ences about the outcomes that are no less (or little less) strong than 
those of citizens. But even if they have a bit less of an interest in the 
outcome of elections than their citizen neighbors, it still seems to be 
sufficiently hefty to merit some voting power. Despite this fact (and 
periods of our history to the contrary),237 resident aliens now lack the 
right to vote in most every jurisdiction in the country.238 (They are, 
however, included in the population base for reapportionment pur­
poses, which gives their citizen neighbors a little extra voting power.) 
One solution, of course, would be to abolish citizenship require­
ments and extend the right to vote to resident aliens.239 But we should 
also be able to tailor voting power to the level of the group's interest. 
If we decided that resident aliens systematically lack the full-blown 
stake in society that their citizen counterparts possess, we could grant 
them the vote but limit its effect on the outcome of any election. And 
while it would probably not be possible to modulate voting power by 
placing resident aliens in larger districts (without diluting their citizen­
neighbors' votes), we could easily do so under other voting schemes 
that give voters multiple votes, such as a cumulative voting system in 
which each voter has several votes to distribute among candidates,240 
or Gerald Frug's proposal to give each voter five votes to cast in the 
local election of her choice.241 If citizen voters were given five votes, 
resident aliens could be given, say, three votes. 
Though it may be symbolically or psychologically damaging to pos­
sess only three-fifths of a full citizen's vote (and conjure up memories 
of the original Census Clause in the Constitution,242 which counted 
237. Alien suffrage was quite common during the nineteenth century, coming to a peak 
in 1875 when twenty-two states and territories granted aliens the right to vote. See KEYSSAR, 
supra note 8, at 32-33, 104-05; Virginia Harper-Ho, Noncitizen Voting Rights: The History, 
the Law and Current Prospects for Change, 18 LAW & INEQUALITY 271, 273-83 (2000) . Anti­
foreigner sentiment, heightened by waves of immigration and World War I, led to the de­
mise of alien suffrage in the first part of the twentieth century. See KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 
136-39; Harper Ho, supra at 282-83. Although some local jurisdictions, such as Takoma Park, 
Maryland, have recently extended the right to vote to aliens, a more widespread movement 
on this front seems unlikely. See KEYSSAR, supra note 8, at 310-11; Harper-Ho, supra at 283-
85. 
238. See Raskin, supra note 2 19, at 1460-61. 
239. See id. (arguing that alien suffrage makes sense for a variety of reasons); Gerald M. 
Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092, 
1093-94 (1977) (arguing that alien suffrage is constitutionally required). 
240. In a cumulative voting scheme, each person is allotted as many votes as there are 
open seats. Voters may distribute their votes as they see fit, either aggregating their votes for 
one strongly preferred alternative or dispersing their votes among several alternatives. See 
Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single-Member Dis­
tricts, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135, 1156 (1993) (arguing that cumulative voting and other 
"semiproportional election systems may provide a more politically fair route to participation 
and political representation for racially distinct groups"). 
241. See FRUG, supra note 183, at 106-07. 
242. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
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slaves as three-fifths of a person for apportionment purposes), it may 
be better than nothing (the current status). But the real points here 
are that voting power does not have to be an all-or-nothing proposi­
tion, and that there may be times and places when legislatures should 
have the power, within constraints, to tailor access to the polls (here, 
in terms of the number of votes) and district size to accommodate the 
unique status of some groups. And while the case of resident aliens 
probably presents a fairly contentious example, a less controversial 
proposal might involve giving part-time residents or college students 
partial voting power in each of their local communities. 
A third round of suggested changes comes out of the relationship 
between quantitative and qualitative vote dilution. Because of their 
close relationship, and the essentially normative character of each, we 
should be able to think about them as more or less interchangeable. If, 
for example, a particular group's vote is qualitatively diluted, we could 
quantitatively concentrate it in order to shore up its power at the polls. 
To be more concrete, imagine a typical claim of qualitative vote 
dilution brought by a group of black voters against a congressional dis­
tricting plan under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.243 In order to 
succeed, the plaintiffs would need to show, in the words of the Act, 
that the plan gives them "less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect represen­
tatives of their choice."244 This they could do by proving the factors 
laid out in Thornburgh v. Gingles,245 the Supreme Court's first inter­
pretation of the 1982 amendments or, more recently, by reference to a 
totality of the circumstances.246 
243. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973bb-1 (2000). 
244. 42 u.s.c. § 1973(b). 
245. 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). The three-part test for vote dilution requires the plaintiff 
to demonstrate that (1) the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact 
to constitute a majority in a single-member district, (2) the minority group is politically cohe­
sive, and (3) the majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to defeat the minority's pre­
ferred candidate usually. See id. 
246. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) (requiring courts to go beyond 
Gingles's three-pronged test and analyze the totality of the circumstances). The Johnson 
Court, quoting Gingles, summarized the factors laid out in the Senate Report that accompa­
nied the 1982 a mendments to the Voting Rights Act: 
The Senate Report specifies factors which typically may be relevant to a § 2 claim: the his­
tory of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision; the extent to which 
voting.in the elections of the State or political subdivision is racially polarized; the extent to 
which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to 
enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually 
large election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting; 
the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes; the extent 
to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as 
education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in 
the political process; the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and the 
extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the 
jurisdiction. The Report notes also that evidence demonstrating that elected officials are un­
responsive to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group and that the 
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Once the plaintiffs succeeded in proving dilution, the proposed 
remedy would most likely be a redrawn districting plan in which 
members of the minority group constitute a voting majority in one or 
more of the districts. Importantly, all of this currently takes place 
within the strictures of the constitutional one person, one vote re­
quirement. That is, the original and redrawn districts need to have the 
same number of people in them (or, in the case of state and local dis­
tricts, close to the same number of people). The lines are changed, but 
the population of each district remains the same. 
But if the two types of dilution are related, we should be able to 
manipulate both the shape and the size of the district in order to shore 
up minority political participation.247 That is, in addition to redrawing 
district lines in a way that creates majority-minority districts, we could 
allow plaintiffs to propose (and courts to approve) remedial plans that 
reduce the numerical size of those districts to further concentrate 
black voting power. This would give voting-rights plaintiffs additional 
tools to use in their quest for more effective participation. 
These suggestions are not meant to be exhaustive, nor are they 
meant to suggest that judicial micromanagement of voting power 
based on an analysis of group preferences is necessarily a good idea. 
Instead, the point is that despite appearances (and law) to the con­
trary, the three principal varieties of voting rights - involving access 
to the ballot box, quantitative dilution, and qualitative dilution - all 
necessarily entail normative judgments of a related character. So when 
we think about one aspect of voting rights, we should be thinking 
about all of them. When state legislatures make redistricting decisions, 
they should be able to manipulate district size in order, say, to meet 
the strictures of the Voting Rights Act. And once we decide that 
courts should intervene in democratic politics, we should equip them 
with a full arsenal of possible remedies. 
Indeed, it may well be that removing the aura of objectivity from 
the one person, one vote claims would result in less judicial involve­
ment in democratic politics. If the legal bar for such claims were 
raised, it would prevent groups from piggybacking their real claims on 
the backs of violations of the one person, one vote standard. And the 
judiciary might be less inclined to intervene in disputes that visibly re­
quire them to make substantive political decisions. Rick Hasen re­
cently wrote that Reynolds v. Sims begets Bush v. Gore.248 If he is right 
policy underlying the State's or the political subdivisions's use of the contested practice or 
structure is tenuous may have probative value. 
Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1010-11 n.9 (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45 (internal citations 
omitted)). 
247. For a variation of this idea, see Hayden, supra note 231. 
248. Richard L. Hasen, A "Tincture of Justice": Judge Posner's Failed Rehabilitation of 
Bush v. Gore, 80 TEXAS L. REV. 137, 154 (2001) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, 
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(and I think that he is), bringing the one person, one vote standard 
back down to the messy world of democratic politics where it belongs 
may not be such a bad thing. 
CONCLUSION 
The three types of voting rights, developed over three generations 
of minority-voting-rights litigation, have resulted in tremendous ad­
vances in political participation. But the second type of right - that 
involving quantitative vote dilution and the one person, one vote stan­
dard - is based in part on a false promise of neutrality and objectiv­
ity. That false promise now has come back to haunt us: it divorces 
voting rights law from the reality of preference aggregation and pre­
vents us from developing a more complete theory of voting rights. 
A more complete theory of voting rights may, preliminarily, tell us 
a couple of things. It may tell us, for example, that the law should not 
be structured in a way that treats the three types of voting rights 
claims - access to the ballot box, quantitative dilution, and qualitative 
vote dilution - within three entirely different doctrinal frameworks. 
Under current law, the sources of the rights are different (some are 
constitutionalized, some not), the substantive requirements of the 
claims are different (some require intent, some do not), and the pro­
cedural prerequisites are different (some have reduced requirements 
for standing, for example). The fact that each of the rights, though, are 
at some level interchangeable, coupled with the essentially normative 
character of all three, means that such a disjointed approach is not 
true to the underlying nature of the claims. 
The fact that the three types of voting rights are inextricably linked 
together means that legislatures and courts should have more leeway 
in analyzing them and in fashioning remedies. Thus, when pursuing 
certain social goals, such as providing meaningful political participa­
tion to historically disadvantaged minority groups, we should allow 
Congress, state legislatures, and courts to tinker with all three aspects 
of voting rights. Minority plaintiffs in section 2 Voting Rights Act 
cases and the Justice Department in section 5 preclearance cases 
should be able to propose districts that not only serve to concentrate 
the minority vote qualitatively, but quantitatively as well. Keeping 
such issues and claims strictly compartmentalized makes little sense 
from either a theoretical or practical standpoint. 
Thus, analyzing the one person, one vote standard from the per­
spective of interpersonal utility comparisons frees us of the false 
promise, and resulting constraints, of the seemingly objective nature of 
the standard. It shows the essentially normative character of all deci-
BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 
(2001)). 
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sions to grant, deny, or dilute the right to vote. And it may provide us 
with a more unified theory of voting rights. 
